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ROBERTA S. KARMEL*

The Applicability of the
Margin Regulations to
Foreign Financial Institutions
I. Introduction
Since December, 1968, the Department of Justice has prosecuted criminally, for violations of the margin regulations, two Swiss banks and a
brokerage firm located in Montevideo, Uruguay, as well as two U.S.
broker-dealers with which such foreign financial institutions maintained
accounts.1 In July, 1969, the Federal Reserve Board amended the provisions of the margin regulations upon which such prosecutions were based. 2

Additionally, extraterritorial effect has been given to various sections of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,3 (hereinafter referred to as "Exchange Act") in a number of recent court cases. 4 These developments have

become a matter of concern to foreign financial institutions which deal in
*Roberta S. Karmel, Member of the New York Bar; formerly Assistant Regional
Administrator, U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission, New York Regional Office;
graduate of Radcliffe College (A.B. 1959) and New York University School of Law (L.L.B.
1962).
'United States v. Weisscredit Banca Comerciale e D'Investimenti, Docket No. 70 Crim.
29 (S.D.N.Y.); United States v. Lerner, Docket No. 69 Crim. 431 (S.D.N.Y.); United States
v. Arzi Bank, A.G., Docket No. 68 Crim. 1011 (S.D.N.Y.). The investigation of possible
violations of law by U.S. citizens through foreign bank accounts has generated considerable
publicity. E.g., Anderson, Stock & Trade, N.Y. Post, Jan. 7, 1970, at 50; Penn, Cheating on
Stocks-Federal Agents Close in on Wall Street Scheme to Evade Tax on Gains, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 6; Rustin, Crackdown on Concealment-More Indictments Loom in
U. S. Assault on Illicit Uses of Swiss Bank Accounts, Wall St., J., April 23, 1969, at 38, col.
1; Sheehan, More Americans Cheating with Swiss Bank Accounts, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30,
1969, at 1, col. 8; The Shennanigans of the Swiss Banks, NEWSWEEK, Dec. 23, 1968, at 65.
A critical response to such adverse publicity is contained in S. J. Rundt & Associates, Assualt
on Privacy-U. S. Officials Ought to Stop Maligning Swiss Banks, Barron's, Jan. 20, 1969, at
I.
2
See notes 45-48, infra.
315 U.S.C. § 78a, et seq., as amended.
4
Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 405 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1968) (per curiam), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 975 (1969); Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968). cert. denied
sub nom. Manley v. Schoenbaum, 395 U.S. 906 (1969). See Goldman & Magrino, Some
Aspects of Securities Regulation: Towards a Re-evaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015 (1969); Comment, Extraterritorial Application of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 94 (1969).
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American securities, because the question of whether, or to what extent,
foreign financial institutions may be subject to the Exchange Act has been

raised, but not satisfactorily answered.
The securities industry is developing along increasingly transnational
lines, and a complicated combination of political and economic circumstances has led to an unprecedented use of foreign financial institutions for
the financing of various types of transactions in American securities. 5
Whether this situation is good or bad for the American economy is a

political question which is beyond the scope of this article. However, it is a
question to which reasonable and informed authorities could give different
answers, and which different federal agencies are inclined to approach with
different premises and different solutions. 6 Furthermore, it is a question
7
which affects American foreign policy, as well as the domestic economy.
5

1Ball, The Bond Americans Can't Buy, FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968, at 69; Malabre, Cash
From Abroad-ForeignInvestments in U. S. Rise Sharply After Long Drought, Wall St. J.,
Nov. 27, 1968, at 1, col. 6; Mayer, A Roundup of the World Economy, FORTUNE, Sept. 15,
1968,6 at 23; The Foreign Evasion, FORBES, Feb. I, 1969, at 55.
See Haskins, The Off-Shore Fund, 8 COLUM. J. TRANSNATIONAL L., No. 1 (1969). The
Treasury Department has favored a broad program to alleviate the balance of payments deficit
by encouraging foreign investment in U. S. securities, which among other things, has resulted
in the passage of the Foreign Investors Tax Act of 1966. Pub. Law No. 89-809, 89th Cong.,
2d Sess., Tit. 1 (1966); S. Rep. No. 1707, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966) 9. The SEC, on the
other hand, has urged that foreigners be accorded substantially the same treatment as Americans under the Securities Acts. See, e.g., Brief for the SEC as Amicus Curiae, Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook, supra note 4; compare Report to the President of the United States from the Task
Force on Promoting Foreign Investment in United States Corporate Securities and Increased
Foreign Financing for United States Corporations Operating Abroad (1964) (hereinafter cited
as "Fowler Report"), with Report of Special Study of Securities Markets of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, Pt. 4, Ch.X, H.R. Doc. No. 95, 88th Cong., '1st Sess. (1963)
(hereinafter cited as "Special Study"). The Federal Reserve Board shares the concerns of
both the Treasury Department and the SEC, and accordingly has vacillated on the issue as to
whether foreign financial institutions are subject to the margin regulations, see text at notes
49-53 infra, and has thus far avoided any position on the issue. See text at notes 47-48, infra.
The public policy questions involved in this area are subtle and complex, and are unlikely to
be resolved by the shibboleths of any one of the federal agencies. At least one critic has
persuasively argued that the premises and recommendations of the Fowler Report and similar
government pronouncements are politically biased and fail to strike at the heart of the
balance-of-payments problem. Hynning, Balance-of-Payment Controls by the United States,
2 INT'L LAWYER 400(1968). Although there is reason to believe that foreign investment in
U.S. securities is to some extent speculative in nature, The Foreign Invasion, supra note 5,
and that tight money policies of the Federal Reserve Board curtail stock market speculation,
Elia, Brokers Say Fed Policy Will Cut Flow of Funds into Share Purchases,Wall St. J., Mar.
14, 1968, at 1, col. 8, these views are based more on surmise than information. The
recommendation by the SEC that foreign lenders should be subject to the margin regulations,
Special Study, supra at 39, was based on virtually no information about the activities of such
lenders, except for information acquired incidental to an investigation of factors. Id. at 30-32.
The SEC's premise that foreign investors ought to be accorded the same protection as
American investors is not necessarily shared by foreign states, which in any event would
prefer7 to pass their own laws. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7867 (Apr. 21, 1966).
See 21 Rec. Ass'n Bar of N. Y. 240 (April 1966).
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Accordingly, the answer to this question, or even the context in which it is
raised, should not be left to the discretion of the Department of Justice or a
federal grand jury, as has been the case in recent criminal prosecutions, or
to the accident of case law development in private lawsuits.
The objective of this article is to explore the legal issues, as well as
certain practical problems, which should properly be considered before any
of the provisions of the Exchange Act, but particularly the margin regulations, are applied to a foreign bank by a federal agency or court. Additionally, it is hoped that this article will be of assistance to private practitioners in advising clients who are either foreign financial institutions or
American broker-dealers which maintain accounts for such institutions as
to their possible exposure under the margin regulations.
II. The General Provisions of the Margin Regulations
A. Statutory Authority and Purpose
The statutory authority for the margin regulations is contained in Section
7 of the Exchange Act. 8 Sections 7(a) and (b) authorize the Federal
Reserve Board to prescribe regulations with respect to the amount of credit
that may be initially extended and subsequently maintained on securities.
Section 7(c) prohibits any member of a national securities exchange or any
broker or dealer from directly or indirectly extending or maintaining credit
or arranging for the extension or maintenance of credit to or for any
customer on securities or on collateral other than securities, except in
accordance with the rules and regulations of the Federal Reserve Board. 9
Section 7(d) makes it unlawful for other lenders to extend or maintain
credit or arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit in contravention of the rules and regulations of the Federal Reserve Board.
Pursuant to this authority, the Federal Reserve Board has promulgated
Regulation T, 10 which applies to brokers, dealers and members of national
815 U.S.C. § 78g, as amended.
9
Prior to July 29, 1968, Section 7(c) applied only to members of a national securities
exchange or broker-dealers who transacted a business in securities through the medium of any
such member. Further, broker-dealers subject to the margin requirements were permitted to
extend credit only on securities registered on a national securities exchange. However, on
July 29, 1968, the statute was amended to permit regulation of the amount of credit that may
be extended and maintained with respect to securities not registered on a national securities
exchange. Public Law 90-437, 82 Stat. 452 (1968). The Federal Reserve Board amended the
margin regulations to conform to the amendments to the statute on July 8, 1969. See Federal
Reserve Bank of New York Circular No. 6347 (June 6, 1969); Federal Reserve Bank of New
York Circular No.,6291 (Feb. I1, 1969); Fed. Reg. Doc. Nos. 69-1983-85 (filed Feb. 14,
1969).
1012 C.F.R. 220.
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securities exchanges, Regulation U, 11 which applies to banking institutions
12
supervised by federal or state government agencies, and Regulation G,
which applies to certain other institutional lenders.
The margin requirements were enacted for the purpose of preventing the
excessive use of credit for the purchase or carrying of securities. Their
major objective is to regulate and restrict the volume of credit devoted to
financing transactions in securities, in order to protect the national economy.' 3 Three separate philosophies have been found in the legislative his4
tory of the Exchange Act as a justification for the margin requirements:'
(1) excessive credit should not be permitted to cause undue market fluctuations;' 5 (2) credit should not be diverted from more desirable uses elsewhere in the economy into the stock market; 16 and (3) investors should be
7
protected from buying on too thin a margin.'
In cases arising under the margin regulations, one or the other of these
philosophies has been emphasized in order to justify a particular result.' 8
However, the premise upon which the Exchange Act was based was that
stock market speculation was inherently evil and largely responsible for the
Great Depression.' 9 The framers of the bill were primarily concerned
1112 C.F.R. 221.
12C.F.R. 207.
"3Sutro Bros. & Co., 41 S.E.C. 443, 445 (1963).
1411 Loss, SECURITIES REGULATION 1242-43 (2d ed. 1961); Comment, 116 U. PA. L.
REV. 103, 114-15 (1967).
15S. Rep. No. 792, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 3.
16 1d.; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) 8.
17S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 15, at 3; S. Rep. No. 1455, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. (1934) II.
'8 Compare Remar v. Clayton Securities Corporation, 81 F. Supp. 1014 (D. Mass. 1949),
with Moscarelli v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 458-60 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). See also Serzysko v.
Chase Manhattan Bank, 290 F. Supp. 74 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), affd per curiam, 409 F. 2d 1360
(2d Cir.) cert. denied, U.S. (1969).
19See Section 2(4), 15 U.S.C. § 78(b)(2). Both the Senate and House Reports quote a
message sent by President Roosevelt to Congress on February 9, 1934, which contains the
following statement:
"... outside the field of legitimate investment naked speculation has been made far
too alluring and far too easy for those who could and for those who could not afford to
gamble.
"Such speculation has run the scale from the individual who has risked his pay
envelope or his meager savings on a margin transaction involving stocks with whose
true value he was wholly unfamiliar, to the pool of individuals or corporations with
large resources, often not their own, which sought by manipulation to raise or depress
market quotations far out of line with reason, all of this resulting in loss to the average
investor, who is of necessity personally uninformed."
The Reports also contain a supplemental letter of March 26, 1934, from President Roosevelt
to the Chairman of the Committee on Banking and Currency, which states:
"The people of this country are, in overwhelming majority, fully aware of the fact that
unregulated speculation in securities and in commodities was one of the most important
International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3
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about regulating credit in order to curb stock market speculation, as op21
20
posed to directing money into other channels or protecting investors.
To some extent the bill was a compromise between those who felt it was
wise social policy to prohibit the average investor from purchasing securities on credit, and those who felt that some borrowed money was neces22
sary for a highly liquid market.
The Senate Report on the Exchange Act, in the course of enumerating
the various economic and social evils which led to the necessity for federal
regulation of stock market credit, mentions the withdrawal of foreign money from the New York call market as a factor contributing to the 1929
panic and the subsequent hoarding of gold. 23 However, there is no clear
indication in the legislative history that Congress intended to regulate or
restrict credit extensions by foreign banks on American securities. The
scanty and scattered testimony concerning foreign credit in the stock
market primarily reflects the absence of sufficient information upon which
any Congressional intent to regulate or refrain from regulating foreign
24
credit could have been formulated.
B. Persons Subject to the Margin Regulations
Regulation T is applicable to any "creditor" as defined in the regulation,
contributing factors in the artificial and unwarranted 'boom' which had so much to do
with the terrible conditions of the years following 1929." S. Rep. No. 792, supra note
15, at 1-2; H.R. Rep. No. 1383, supra note 16, at 1-2.
Hon. Adolph J. Sabath, a Congressman who testified at the House Hearings on the Exchange
Act, likened the stock exchange to a dishonest gambling house. Stock Exchange Regulation,
Hearing Before the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong., 2d
Sess. 20(1934) 827, 829. Cf. id. at 35-36.
Mr. E. A. Goldenweiser, Director of Research and Statistics of the Federal Reserve
Board, in his testimony on the Exchange Act stated:
"It is often said that the stock exchange diverts funds from business to the stock
market. As a general statement, that statement is not, strictly speaking, correct, because the credit does not stay in the stock market. ...
"It is, however, true that the stock exchange diverts credit from small industries
throughout the country into the large corporations." Stock Exchange Regulation, supra
note 19, at 67-68.
Mr. Goldenweiser and Mr. Woodlief Thomas, who was on the Research Staff of the Federal
Reserve Board, were in agreement that excessive stock market credit made securities rise too
high and fast and fall too low and fast, and stimulated a rapid expansion and contraction of the
total amount
of credit in the economy. Id. at 57, 67.
21
The House Report on the Exchange Act explicitly states that the main purpose of the
bill is neither to increase the safety of security loans to lenders nor to protect the small
speculator, even though "such a result will be achieved as a by-product of the main purpose."
H.R. 22Rep. No. 1383, supra note 16, at 8.
Testimony of Thomas Gardiner Corcoran, Stock Exchange Regulation, supra note 19,
at 97.
23S.
Rep. No. 792, supra note 15, at 4.
24
E.g., Stock Exchange Regulation, supra note 19, at 69-7 1.
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namely, "any broker or dealer including every member of a national securities exchange." '2 5 A "broker" is defined in Section 3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act as "any person engaged in the business of effecting transactions in securities for the account of others, but does not include a bank."
A "dealer" is defined in Section 3(a)(5) as "any person engaged in the
business of buying and selling securities for his own account" except "not
as a part of a regular business" and except for banks. The term "bank" is
limited by Section 3(a)(6) to banking institutions organized under the laws
of the United States and supervised and examined by state or federal
authorities.
Regulation U applies to banks,2 6 but it would not apply to a foreign
financial institution, which is not organized under the laws of the United
States nor supervised by state or federal authorities. Therefore, a foreign
bank would not be subject to any of the provisions of Regulation U.
Regulation G applies to a person who is not subject to Regulation T or
Regulation U and who, in the ordinary course of business during any
calendar quarter, extends or arranges for the extension of $50,000 or more,
or has outstanding at any time during the quarter $100,000 or more, in
credit, secured directly or indirectly, in whole or in part, by collateral that
27
includes any margin securities.
The separation between commercial and investment banking required
under United States law, is not made by foreign banking institutions. Thus
a foreign bank usually acts as a broker in effecting purchases and sales of
securities for customers, for which it charges a commission, and as a dealer
in effecting transactions for its own account, and it also acts as a bank in
28
effecting other types of transactions including the making of loans. It
would not be subject to Regulation U with regard to its lending activities,
because it is not a regulated United States bank, but it could be subject to
Regulation G with regard to such activities. However, if a foreign bank is
subject to Regulation T, then it could not be subject to Regulation G.
C. Operation of Regulations T and G

In general, a broker or dealer subject to Regulation T is prohibited from
extending credit to its customers for the purpose of purchasing or carrying
securities, except on margin securities, and then the amount of the loan

- 12 C.F.R. 220.2(b).

2812 C.F.R. 221.1(a).
2712 C.F.R. 207.1(a).
28

The Worldly Banks,

FORTUNE, Sept. 15, 1968, at 107.
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may not exceed 20% of the market value of the securities. 29 Similarly a
Regulation G lender may not loan more than 20% of the current market
value on any margin securities which are collateral for a loan to purchase
or carry any such securities. 30
Section 7(c) of the Exchange Act makes it unlawful for a broker-dealer
to "arrange" for the extension or maintenance of credit in contravention of
the credit regulations. Section 220.7(a) of Regulation T provides
A creditor may arrange for the extension or maintenance of credit to or for
any customer of such creditor by any person upon the same terms and
conditions as those upon which the creditor, under the provisions of this part,
may himself extend or maintain such credit to such customer, but only upon
such terms and conditions, except that this limitation shall not apply with
respect to the arranging by a creditor for a bank subject to Part 221 of this
Chapter (Regulation U) to extend or maintain credit on margin securities or
exempted securities.
A Regulation G lender is similarly precluded from arranging for the extension or maintenance of credit except upon the same terms and conditions
upon which he could extend or maintain credit. 3 '
In Sutro Bros. and Co.,3 2 the Division of Trading and Exchanges of the
Securities and Exchange Commission (hereinafter referred to as "SEC")
urged that a broker unlawfully "arranges" for a credit extension if knowing
or with reasonable grounds to know that a customer has secured credit in
excess of that permitted by Regulation T, the broker performs any act for
the purpose of assisting the customer in implementing the loan. Similarly,
in Russell L. Irish,33 the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as "NASD") took the position that mere knowledge on the part of a broker that a loan had been made to a customer by a
bank collateralized by mutual fund shares bought from the broker, made
the broker's participation in the transaction an unlawful arranging where all
the broker did was advise the mutual fund to send certificates to him for
transmittal to the customer.

2912 C.F.R. 220.8. "Margin securities" are securities registered on a national securities
exchange, plus certain over-the-counter stocks which the Federal Reserve Board determines
to have the degree of national investor interest, the depth and breadth of market, the
availability of information respecting such stocks and their issuers, and the character and
permanence of the issuers, to warrant treatment similar to stocks that are registered on
national securities exchanges. A list of these stocks is promulgated by the Board from time to
time. Supra note 9.
3012 C.F.R. 207.5(a).
112 C.F.R. 207.4(f). The comparable provision of Regulation U is 12 C.F.R. 221.3(u).
32Supra note 13.
'3 Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7718 (October 5, 1968).
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In both cases, the Commission rejected these contentions, stating that
In view of the language and history of Regulation T, we are not prepared to
find an "arranging" by a broker-dealer where the customer on his own
initiative and without recommendation, assistance or advice from the broker
establishes credit and the terms thereof with another for accomplishing collateral loan transactions and the only function, activity or connection of the
broker and its employees with the parties and the transactions is to execute
the customer's orders and follow the customer's instructions as to delivery of
securities and receipt of payment. In our view, Regulation T does not suggest
such a result, and to hold otherwise would in effect make the broker an
insurer that customers were employing credit, wherever
secured, only to the
34
extent that credit could be provided by the broker.
However, if a broker permits himself to become an intermediary between his customer and another lender, by conveying the customer's communications or instructions to the lender or by responding to requests or
directives of the lender concerning the customer's transactions, the broker
becomes so involved in the extension or maintenance of credit that he is
"arranging." Therefore, in the Irish case, the signing of a receipt for
payment of mutual fund shares which stated that the broker would deliver
the certificates to the bank as collateral for the loan, where the bank would
not otherwise have made such payment, was held an unlawful "arranging."
It is important to note that a broker can be liable for unlawful arranging
with respect to a credit extension which a broker could not make under
Regulation T, even if the lender is not acting in violation of the law. For
example, the Sutro case involved loans by factors, who at that time were
unregulated lenders. Sutro Bros. & Co. was in no way assisting its customers or the factors involved to perform any unlawful act, but rather was
unlawfully arranging for loans which Sutro Bros. & Co. could not have
legally made. On the other hand, where a broker arranges for a credit
extension by another lender, governed by Regulations U or G, and such
other lender acts illegally, the broker can be held liable either on the theory
that he is unlawfully arranging, or on the theory that he is aiding or abetting
35
another's violation.
D. The Activities in which a Foreign Bank Engages
Where a foreign financial institution purchases or sells securities for the
accounts of its customers, it is acting as a "broker" as defined in Section
3(a)(4) of the Exchange Act, and where such transactions are effected for
34

1d. at 3; Sutro Bros. & Co., supra note 13, at 45 1-52.
Remar v. Clayton Securities Corporation, supra note 18; 1953 Fed. Res. Bull. 950, 12
C.F.R. 220.111.
35
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its own account, it is acting as a "dealer" as defined in Section 3(a)(5) of
the Exchange Act. 36 Accordingly, a foreign bank which maintains an ac-

count with a U.S. firm through which it purchases and sells securities falls
within the literal definition of a "creditor" subject to Regulation T.
Furthermore, such a foreign bank would also fall within the definition of
a "broker" or "dealer" under various other provisions of the Exchange
Act, such as the broker-dealer registration provisions, 37 the SEC's bookkeeping rules, 38 and the SEC's net capital rule. 39 In short, the foreign bank
would be subject to the entire gambit of complex and detailed regulations
to which U.S. broker-dealers are subject. While an explanation of these

regulations is beyond the scope of this acticle, it is important to note that
the various regulations are interrelated, and all of them contain requirements to make and keep books and records which are subject to inspection
and examination by the SEC. 40 In order to comply with such requirements,
many foreign banks would be acting in violation of the bank secrecy laws
of their own countries. 41 Nevertheless, if a foreign financial institution is

subject to Regulation T because it is a "broker-dealer" under the Exchange
Act, it is difficult to argue logically that it is not subject to other provisions
of the Exchange Act applicable to broker-dealers.
U.S.C. § 78c(a)(4) and (5).
Section 15(b), 15 U.S.C. § 780(b).

3615

37

38

Section 17(a), 15 U.S.C. § 78q(a) and the various rules promulgated thereunder. The
most important of these rules are: Rule 17(a)(3), which requires that certain types of records
be made and kept; Rule 17(a)(4), which requires that records be preserved for various periods
of time; Rule 17(a)(5), which requires the filing of an annual certified financial statement; Rule
17(a)(7), which requires non-resident (or foreign) broker-dealers to maintain a set of records
within the U.S., or make alternative arrangements to facilitate the inspection of records. 17
17-a-5, and 17a-7,
C.F.R.
3 240.17a-3, 17a-4,
1Rule 15(c)(3)(1), 17 C.F.R. 240.15c3-1. See Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 8024
(Jan. 4018, 1967).
Certain of the books and records which broker-dealers are required to keep are
specifically for the purpose of insuring compliance with the net capital rule. Securities
Exchange Act Release No. 8023 (Jan. 18, 1967). Further, failing to keep sufficiently adequate
records to determine financial condition may constitute a fraud, Ackmerge Securities Co.,
Inc., Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7962 (Sept. 26, 1966), and is sufficient grounds to
obtain an order restraining a broker-dealer from conducting business. Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Dunhill Securities Corp., Docket No. 68 Civ. 2152 (S.D.N.Y.); Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Tilney & Company, Docket No. 67 Civ. 3153 (S.D.N.Y.). Regulation T provides that adequate records shall be maintained for each account carried by a
broker-dealer showing the full details of transactions in the account. 12 C.F.R. 220.4(a)(2).
These records are the best evidence of whether violations have occurred. Wesco and Company, Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7928 (Aug. 5, 1966); Madison Management Corp.,
Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7453 (Oct. 30, 1964). Regulation G also contains various
record
keeping requirements. 12 C.F.R. 207. l(a) and (e) and 207.3.
41
See First National City Bank v. Internal Revenue Service, 271 F.2d 616 (1959), cert.
denied, 361 U.S. 948 (1960); Fontaine v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 259 F. Supp.
880 (D.P.R. 1966); S. J. Rundt & Associates, supra note 1.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3
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Some foreign financial institutions which do not purchase or sell securities through an account with a U.S. broker-dealer may nevertheless
receive and deliver securities at U.S. banks or broker-dealers, and such
transactions may be incidental to loans involving such securities. In such a
situation, the foreign financial institution probably is not acting as a broker-dealer so as to possibly be deemed a "creditor" under Regulation T,
but the transactions may nevertheless pose a problem under the credit
regulations.
E. Types ofAccounts which a Foreign Bank
May Maintain with a U.S. Broker-Dealer
A foreign financial institution which effects transactions in U.S. securities through a United States broker-dealer may do so in either a "general"
(or margin) account, a "cash" account or an "omnibus" account. Transactions effected through a margin or cash account would be governed under
Regulation T by the same rules relating to such accounts maintained by
any customer of the firm. In a cash or margin account a foreign bank would
have to (1) make full cash payment for securities other than margin securities, including most over-the-counter securities, purchased within seven
days after the date of purchase; 42 or (2) deposit at least 80% of the market
value, in cash or securities, of any margin securities it purchases. 43 In
certain situations, the foreign bank could arrange for deliveries against
payment of securities purchased, and then it might have as much as 35
days to pay for purchases of securities, but this device could not be used to
44
evade the necessity for prompt and good faith cash payment.
Although transactions effected by one broker-dealer for the account of
another broker-dealer are generally governed by the same provisions applicable to any customer, 45 a member firm may maintain an omnibus
account for another broker-dealer under the terms and conditions set forth
in Secion 220.4(b) of Regulation T. In this type of account, the member
firm is restricted as to how much credit it may extend to its broker-dealer
customer only by the rules of the New York Stock Exchange rather than
any provision of Regulation T. The broker-dealer customer would only
have to deposit 25% of the market value of all securities "long" in the
account and from 30% to 100% (depending upon the price of the security)
46
of all securities "short."
4212 C.F.R. 220.4(c)(2).
-12 C.F.R. 220.3(b).
4412 C.F.R. 220.4(a)(3); 12 C.F.R. 220.4(c)(5).
4512 C.F.R. 220.5(c).
46Rule 43 1(a) of the New York Stock Exchange.
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Prior to July 8, 1969, Section 220.4(b) of Regulation T read as follows:
In a special omnibus account, a member of a national securities exchange
may effect and finance transactions for a broker or dealer from whom the
member accepts in good faith a signed statement to the effect that he is
subject to the provisions of this Part (or that he does not extend or maintain
credit to or for customers except in accordance therewith as if he were
subject thereto) and from whom the member receives (1) written notice,
pursuant to a rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the
hypothecation of customers' securities by brokers or dealers, Rule 8c- 1 (17
CFR § 240.8c- 1) or Rule 15c2-1 (17 CFR § 240.15c2- 1), to the effect that
all securities carried in the account will be carried for the account of the
customers of the broker or dealer and (2) written notice that any short sales
effected in the account will be short sales made in behalf of the customers of
the broker or dealer other than his partners.
In February, 1969, a proposed amendment to Regulation T was announced by the Federal Reserve Board which would have required a
broker-dealer wishing to maintain an omnibus account to certify that it was
actually subject to Regulation T, instead of merely certifying that it would
conduct itself as if subject to the Regulation in its credit transactions. In
announcing this amendment, the Federal Reserve Board stated:
Credit which is exempt from margin requirements can be extended by
broker-dealers through a special omnibus account to persons, including foreign firms, who certify that they observe the regulation even though they are
not subject to it.
The proposed change is not designed to make foreign banks or broker-dealers subject to U.S. supervision, but only to limit the use of the
special omnibus account privilege to institutions that certify that they are
actually subject to Regulation T. The privilege would no longer be available
to organizations-including foreign financial institutions and others-that prefer not to make such a certification.
A special omnibus account is an account in which a member of an exchange may make wholesale transactions for other brokers without regard to
margin requirements. These transactions involve customers' securities on
which margin requirements have already been imposed at the retail level. The
Department of Justice and the SEC recently presented to the House Banking
and Currency Committee evidence of abuses whereby special omnibus accounts have been used
by some foreign financial institutions to avoid U. S.
47
margin requirements.

However, the amendments to the omnibus account provisions which
were finally promulgated and became effective on July 8, 1969, limited the
exemption from margin regulation available through a special omnibus
account to members of national stock exchanges and brokers and dealers

47

Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular No. 6291 (Feb. 11, 1969).
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registered with the SEC. As amended on July 8, 1969, Section 220.4(b) of
Regulation T reads as follows:
In a special omnibus account, a member of a national securities exchange
may effect and finance transactions for another member of a national securities exchange or a broker or dealer registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission under section 15 of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 (15 U.S.C. 780) from whom the member receives (1) written notice,
pursuant to a rule of the Securities and Exchange Commission concerning the
hypothecation of customers' securities by brokers or dealers (Rule 8c- 1(17
CFR 240.8c- 1) or Rule 15c2- 1 (7 CFR 240.15c2- 1) ), to the effect that all
securities carried in the account will be carried for the account of the customers of the broker or dealer and (2) written notice that any short sales effected
in the account will be short sales made in behalf of the customers of the
broker or dealer other than his partners. No substitutions of collateral securing credit extended to a broker or dealer not described in the preceding
sentence shall be permitted after October 6, 1969, and no such credit shall be
maintained after July 8, 1970.
In announcing the July 8, 1969, amendments, the Federal Reserve
Board issued a statement 48 which was almost indentical to its statement of
February 11, 1969. No explanation was given for the revisions in the
amendments to the omnibus account provisions.
F. The Abortive Agency Provisions
of the Margin Regulations
A proposed amendment to Regulation U published by the Federal Reserve Board on February 8, 1968, would have prevented any regulated
bank from acting as agent of any person extending credit which the bank
knew, or should have known, was secured directly or indirectly by any
registered security, unless the bank accepted in good faith a statement
signed by such person that he did not extend or maintain credit to or for
customers in violation of Regulations G, T or U. The activities of an agent
were defined to include receiving securities to be used as collateral for
credit, determining whether the market value of the collateral was adequate
and requiring the deposit of additional collateral or the reduction of credit.
Similar prohibitions were proposed for Regulations T and G. Compliance
with these provisions, which were scheduled to go into effect on March 11,
1968, would have prevented any regulated lender from accepting delivery
of securities against payment for the account of a foreign financial institution where the lender knew or should have known that such securities
were to be used as collateral in a loan by the foreign financial institution for
48

Federal Reserve Bank of New York Circular No. 6347 (June 6, 1969).
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the purchase of such securities. In announcing these amendments, the
Board stated that they were directed against excessive credit flowing into
the securities markets in circumvention of the other provisions of Section 7
49
of the Exchange Act.
Subsequently, the effective date of this amendment was delayed to April
10, 1968,50 and then on April 4, 1968, the Federal Reserve Board published a revision of the proposed amendment, which read as follows:
A bank subject to [Regulation U] ...may, without regard to [the provision
requiring a signed statement to the effect that a person for whom a bank is
acting as agent does not extend or maintain credit in violation of Regulations
G, T or U], act as agent of a bank or similar financial institution.., formed
under the laws of a foreign State ...if such foreign bank has filed with such
domestic bank a statement signed by a duly authorized officer of the foreign
bank, and accepted in good faith by a duly authorized officer of the domestic
bank, to the effect that the foreign bank will not request the domestic bank to
act as agent in respect of any transaction (i) which is connected with an
extension of credit by it secured directly or indirectly by any registered equity
security to any citizen or resident of the United States, or (ii) as to which the
foreign bank knows or should know that any other person is extending credit
in connection with such transaction to any citizen or resident of the United
States secured directly or indirectly by any registered equity security.
In its announcement of this revised proposal regarding agency prohibitions,
the Federal Reserve Board stated that the changes were designed to
"mitigate administrative burdens involved in handling a substantial volume
of ministerial agency transactions, particularly transactions on behalf of
foreign banks. ' '5 1 Although this revised amendment went into effect on
April 17, 1968, on April 18, 1968, the Board deferred the date on which
banks were required to obtain the statements required by the amendment
to May 17, 1968,52 on which date the amendment was revoked entirely.
In discarding the prohibitions relating to acting as agent upon all regulated
lenders, the Board merely stated that these provisions were being revoked
because they might give rise to disproportionate operational problems,
particularly with respect to transactions involving foreign principals.53
At the present time, therefore, there is nothing to prevent a regulated
U.S. lender from acting as agent for a foreign financial institution, and the
agency prohibitions never really became operative. Nevertheless, the Fed-

4933 Fed. Reg. 2691-2706 (Feb. 8, 1968).
5033 Fed. Reg. 4249 (March 7, 1968).
5133 Fed. Reg. 5349 (April 4, 1968).
5233 Fed. Reg. 5943 (April 18, 1968).
5333 Fed. Reg. 7230-31 (May 16, 1968). The comparable amendments to Regulations T
and G were similarly revoked on May 7, 1968.
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eral Reserve Board has not gone so far as to say that foreign financial
institutions are not subject to the margin regulations.
G. The Promulgationof Regulation G
The vacillation of the Federal Reserve Board in applying the margin
regulations to the activities of foreign banks, as shown by the history of the
abortive agency provisions, is directly related to the promulgation by the
Board of Regulation G, which became effective on March 11, 1968, and
which applies to lenders which were theretofore not subject to the margin
regulations. The impetus for this new regulation originated from the SEC's
Special Study of the Securities Markets, which was transmitted by the
SEC to Congress on August 8, 1963. 5 4 In the chapter of the Special Study
devoted to security credit, the SEC recommended that
Under the authority now provided by Section 7 of the Exchange Act, the
Board of Governors should subject "all persons" who make loans to U. S.
residents, on the collateral of securities traded in U. S. markets, to the same
requirements as are applicable to domestic bank loans collateralized by such
securities, subject to appropriate exclusions for lenders in specified categories
such as those not engaged in a business of lending or those never having
aggregate outstanding security loans of more than a specified amount, say
$100,000. To aid in enforcement, domestic lenders should be required to
keep specified records and file periodic reports, and domestic banks should be
prohibited from furnishing any form of assistance or service to any foreign
lender in connection with any loan not in conformity with such requirements. 55

In support of this recommendation, the Special Study found that loans
from foreign sources were important sources of capital for large, active
unregulated lenders.

56

Certain other recommendations made by the Special Study concerning
security credit necessitated amendments to Section 7 of the Exchange
Act. 57 The legislative history of these amendments contains no mention of
58
the applicability of the margin regulations to foreign lenders.
On October 26, 1967, the Federal Reserve Board published notice of
Regulation G. This notice stated:
The purpose of the proposed regulation is to bring lenders other than
banks, brokers, or dealers within the coverage of the Board's rules governing
54
55
56

"Special Study,"

supra note 6.

1d. at 39.

1d. at 30.
Supra note 9.
58
U. S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2795-2803, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968).
57
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margin requirements on securities transactions. Available indications suggest
that excessive credit may flow into the securities mvrkets from such lenders.

Foreign lenders making loans that are used to purchase or carry securities
in this country would be subject to Regulation G. In most such cases, as well
as in many instances involving domestic lenders subject to the regulation, a
reliable agency in this country usually, but not always a bank, must be
employed to hold the collateral for the loan, effect substitutions, collect
interest, and otherwise represent the interest of the lender. Accordingly, a
lender would be prohibited from performing any services in respect to a loan
that was secured directly or indirectly by any registered security unless the
loan was made and maintained in conformity with the requirements of the
regulation. (A corresponding provision is proposed for insertion into Regulation U; Regulation T already forbids brokers or dealers to perform such
services.) 59
In the final announcement of the revisions made in Regulation G and the

publication of the regulation, the Federal Reserve Board made no mention
of its coverage extending to foreign banks.6 0
Regulation G defines a lender subject to the provisions of the Regulation as "any person subject to the registration requirements of paragraph

(a) of this section who, in the ordinary course of his business, extends or
maintains or arranges for the extension or maintenance of any credit for the
purpose of purchasing or carrying any margin security ... if such credit is
secured ... by collateral that includes any such security." 6 1 A person subject to the registration requirements is a person who, in the ordinary course
of his business, during any calendar quarter, extends or arranges for the

extension of $50,000 or more or has outstanding $100,000 or more in
credit secured by collateral that includes any margin securities, unless such
person is subject to Regulations T or U. Any such person is required,
within 30 days following the end of the quarter in which he becomes

subject to Regulation G, to register with the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve 'Board by filing a Form G- 1 with the Federal Reserve
62
Bank of the district in which the principal office of such person is located.

5932 Fed. Reg. 14855 (Oct. 26, 1967). The provisions regarding the servicing of foreign
accounts proposed at this time were more lenient than the agency prohibitions proposed in
February 1968, supra text at note 49, but more stringent than the provisions in effect at the
present time, supra text at note 53. Proposed § 221.3(t) of Regulation U, published by the
Board on October 26, 1967 read:
No bank shall perform any service in respect to a loan which is for the purpose of
purchasing or carrying a stock registered on a national securities exchange and is
secured by any stock unless such loan is made and maintained in conformity with the
provisions of... (Regulation G, T or U). 32 Fed. Reg. 14858 (Oct. 26, 1967).
601968 Fed. Res. Bull. 168.
61
12 C.F.R. 207. 1(c).
62
12 C.F.R. 207. 1(a).
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Quarterly reports must likewise be filed with the district in which the
63
principal office of the lender is located.
64
In Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Transamerica Corporation,
the
plaintiff charged that the financing of a cash tender offer by a German and
English bank was in violation of Regulation G. The Court held that Regulation G could not apply to foreign banks because no districts of the
Federal Reserve Bank exist abroad. Therefore, the European banks could
not register as Regulation G lenders and accordingly could not be subject
to the restrictions of the Regulation.
As set forth above, between February and May, 1968, the Federal
Reserve Board shifted its position on the agency prohibitions from first
announcing that all foreign banks which use domestic banks as agents in
U.S. securities transactions must agree to abide by the margin regulations,
to then announcing that such agreements need only be obtained regarding
loans to U.S. citizens for the purpose of purchasing or carrying registered
securities, to then abandoning the requirements for any such agreement.
Whether the Board has similarly shifted its position as to applicability of
Regulation G to foreign banks is an open and troublesome question. The
Board has similarly left open the question of whether foreign banks which
effect transactions in U.S. securities are subject to Regulation T. One
reason why these questions are so troublesome is that the application of
the credit regulations to foreign banks could be in violation of international
law.
III. The Extraterritorial Application of Federal Statutes and Section 30(b) of
the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
A. General Principlesof InternationalLaw
International law is a body of principles and rules of conduct which most
states regard as an obligatory standard and commonly observe in their
relations with one another. 65 Unless embodied in an international convention, its force is derived from acquiescence by common consent of
6312
C.F.R. 207.3(a).
64
CCH Fed. Sec. L. Rep. 92,471 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 8, 1969).
65The Scotia, 61 U.S. (14 Wall.) 170, 187-89 (1871); 1 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW
CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE UNITED STATES § I (2d Ed. 1945), and
authorities cited therein. This is essentially an Anglo-American view of international law,
which is firmly rooted in the common law tradition. See Dickenson, The Law of Nations as
Part of the National Law of the United States, Pt. i, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26 (1952), Pt. I!,
101 U. PA. L. REV. 792 (1953). Communist theorists, for example, regard international law as
an aggregate of norms regulating relations between nations in their struggle and cooperation,
and do not regard themselves as obligated to comply with the norms of bourgeois international
law. See GUINS, SOVIET LAW AND SOVIET SOCIETY 330-31 (1954); KELSEN, THE COMMUNIST THEORY OF LAW 188 (1955).
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civilized communities to rules designed to foster amicable and workable
commerical relations, rather than from the extraterritorial reach of national
66
laws, or from the abdication of its sovereign powers by any nation.
International law is operative only so far as it is adopted by the laws and
usages of a country, 67 and therefore it is not superior to domestic law, and
it cannot make or alter domestic law. Although it aims at stability and
order through usages which considerations of comity, reciprocity and
long-range interest have developed to define the domain which each nation
will claim as its own, 68 international law may yield to conflicting domestic
considerations as expressed by statute. 69 Nevertheless, "an act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
'70
possible construction remains."
Under traditional views of international law, as expressed both by international and United States tribunals, the basis of a state's jurisdiction is
territorial, 71 and a nation's laws are operative only within its boundaries.
Since all legislation is prima facie territorial, a statute is ordinarily construed "as intended to be confined in its operation and effect to the
territorial limits over which the lawmaker has general and legitimate
power."72
Nevertheless, there are four generally recognized exceptions to the
territorial principle, namely: (1) nationality; (2) protective; (3) universality;
and (4) passive personality. 73 Under the nationality principle, a state has
jurisdiction to punish its citizens for violations of its laws, even if such
violations are committed outside of its boundaries. 74 Under the protective
principle, a state has jurisdiction to punish a non-resident alien for acts
66

Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 581-82 (1953); THE PAQUETTE HABANA, 175 U.S.
677,700(1900).
67
The Scotland, 105 U. S. (15 Otto) 25, 29 (1881).
v. Larsen, supra note 66 at 582.
6SLauritzen
69
Skiriotes v. Florida, 313 U.S. 69 (1941); Patterson v. Bark Eudora, 190 U.S. 169
(1903).
See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U. S.398 (1964).
70
The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804); The Queen v. Jameson, [1896]
2 Q.B. 425, 430.
71Case of S. S. Lotus, Permanent Court of International Justice Reports, series A,
no. 10,
at p. 18 (1927); The APPOLON, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 362, 370 (1824).
72
American Banana Company v. United Fruit Company, 213 U.S. 347, 357 (1909)
J.).
(Holmes,
73
Harvard Research in International Law, Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime, 29 J.
INT'L L. Supp. 443 (1935). These principles relate primarily to the extraterritorial application
of penal laws. The Exchange Act is both a penal and a remedial statute, which complicates the
question of whether it can be applied extraterritorially without violating international law. Cf.
70 YALE L.J. 259, 266-69 (1960).
Comment,
74
Blackmer v. United States, 284 U.S. 421 (1932); Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d
921, 929-30 (1st Cir. 1948), cert, denied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949).
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committed outside its boundaries, where such acts have a potentially adverse effect on national security or governmental functions.1

5

Under the

universality principle, a state has jurisdiction to punish a person in its
custody who has committed an offense which is a crime under the laws of
all (civilized) nations, without regard to the situs of the crime or the
nationality of the defendant. 76 Under the passive personality principle, a

state has jurisdiction to punish a person who has injured one of its
77
citizens.
The nationality and universality theories could not serve as a basis for

applying the margin regulations to foreign financial institutions. 78 Since the
margin regulations were intended in part to protect investors from purchasing securities on too thin a margin, the passive personality theory could be
used to impose the margin regulations on foreign financial institutions, at
least with respect to extensions of credit to U.S. citizens, but an assertion
79
of jurisdiction on this ground would be difficult to justify.
75

United States v. Bowman, 260 U.S. 94 (1922); United States v. Pizzarusso, 388 F. 2d
8 (2d 76Cir. 1968).
Historically, this principle was the basis for prosecuting pirates, and it was based on the
theory that piracy was an act renouncing allegiance to any nation. United States v. Brig.
Malek Adhel, 43 U.S. 210, 232 (1844). The principle has also been used to suppress the slave
trade and smuggling. I HYDE, supra note 65 §§ 229-35. More recently it has been argued that
the principle should be extended to cover crimes against humanity. Cowles, Universality of
Jurisdiction Over War Crimes, 33 CALIFORNIA L. REV. 177, 181-208 (1945); Comment, 46
CORNELL L.Q. 326 (1961).
77Harvard Research in International Law, supra note 73. The extent to which this
exception is adhered to is questionable. It was impliedly rejected as a basis for jurisdiction by
the Permanent Court of International Justice in the case of S. S. Lotus, supra note 7 I, and it
was squarely rejected by the United States in Cutting's Case, 11 Moore, INTERNATIONAL
LAW DIGEST § 201 (1906). 1 HYDE, supra note 65 § 243.
78
The nationality theory could be used to prohibit U.S. citizens from obtaining loans
from foreign financial institutions in circumvention of the margin regulations, but the prohibitions of the margin regulations are directed only at lenders, rather than at borrowers. Serzysko
v. Chase Manhattan Bank, supra note 18. In two recent cases, borrowers were indicted for
violations of the credit regulations. United States, v. Lerner, supra note I; United States v.
Whorl, Docket No. 69 Crim. 486 (S.D.N.Y.).
Although it is questionable whether a borrower can be adjudged guilty of such violations
except on a conspiracy theory, the defendant in the Whorl case pleaded guilty and therefore
this question has not yet been tested. SEC Litigation Release No. 4478 (November 24, 1969).
Chairman Patman of the House Committee on Banking and Currency has made a number of
proposals which would make it illegal for U. S. citizens to have financial dealings with foreign
financial institutions unless such dealings were reported to the U. S. government.. Sheehan,
supra note 1. Another proposal by Chairman Patman would make it a criminal offense for any
U. S. citizen to have financial dealings with a foreign financial institution which does not allow
bonafide inspection of its records by federal regulatory agencies. Hearing held before House
Committee on Banking and Currency, Practices of Foreign Banking Institutions, (Dec. 9,
1968).79Cf. S. J. Rundt & Associates, supra note 1.
Cf. Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, supra note 4. Protection of small speculators was
thought to be only a by-product of the margin regulations, supra note 21, and the type of
borrower who finances securities transactions through foreign financial institutions is rarely a
small investor. Additionally, it is questionable whether the United States adheres to the
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The soundest basis upon which the margin regulations could be applied
to foreign financial institutions is under an extension of the territorial
principle sometimes called the objective territorial principle. This principle
has been enunciated as follows:
... any state may impose liabilities, even upon persons not within its
allegiance, for conduct outside its borders that has consequences within its
borders which the state reprehends, and these liabilities other states will
ordinarily recognize. 0
It has been used extensively by the federal courts in applying the anti-trust
laws to the activities of foreign corporations abroad, 81 and at least one
court has come close to stating that remedial federal legislation should be
presumed to be extraterritorial.
[l]n absence of direct foreign governmental action compelling the defendant's activities a United States Court may exercise its jurisdiction as to acts
and contracts abroad, if... such acts and contracts have a substantial and
material effect upon our foreign and domestic commerce.8 2
A recent codification of international law states the objective territorial
principle as follows:
A state has jurisdiction to prescribe a rule of law attaching legal consequences to conduct that occurs outside its territory and causes an effect
within its territory, if either
(a) the conduct and its effect are generally'recognized as constituent elements of a crime or tort under the law of states that have reasonably
developed legal systems, or
(b) (i) the conduct and its effect are constituent elements of activity to
which the rule applies; (ii) the effect within the territory is substantial; (iii) it
occurs as a direct and foreseeable result of the conduct outside the territory;
and (iv) the rule is not inconsistent with the principles of justice generally
recognized by states that have reasonably developed legal systems.82
The Committee on International Law of the Association of the Bar of
the City of New York has criticized the above-quoted codification as going
passive personality basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction, supra note 77. The passive personality
theory is open to the objection that it subjects a person to the rules of different legal systems
when dealing with persons of different nationalities and it has been criticized by commentators. See Brierly, The Lotus Case, 44 LAW QUARTERLY REVIEW 154, 160-61 (1928).
a"United States v. Aluminum Company of America, 148 F. 2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945).
The origin of this principle is a statement by Justice Holmes that "[alcts done outside a
jurisdiction, but intended to produce and producing detrimental effects within it, justify a State
in punishing the cause of the harm as if he had been present at the effect, if the State should
succeed in getting him within its power." Strassheim v. Daily, 221 U.S. 280, 285 (1911).
81
BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND AMERICAN BUSINESS ABROAD (1958); Haight, International Law and Extra territorial Application of the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L. J. 639
(1954); 6 WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 118-160 (1968); Comment, 70 YALE
L. J. supra note 73. The most recent case in this area is Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far
East Line, Inc., 404 F. 2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968),cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969). See Wall
St. J.,82Feb. 25, 1969, at 10, col. 2.
United States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Information Center, Inc., 1963 Trade
Cas. 77,415 at 77,457 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
8Section 18, Restatement (Second), Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1965).
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beyond the territorial principle as it is recognized by international practice,
and being a restatement of U.S. municipal law rather than international

law. 84 In this connection, it should be noted that U.S. courts have
frequently applied the same decisional techniques and precedents in cases
involving conflict of laws questions between states of the United States and
85
foreign nations.

To a certain extent, the objective territorial theory coalesces with the
nationality and protective exceptions to the territorial principle of jurisdiction. This rather ill defined basis for applying federal legislation extraterritorially has been called the national interest theory.8 6 The national

interest theory is tantamount to a rejection of international law under the
principle that conflicting and overriding considerations of domestic policy,
as expressed by statute, may justify a court in declining to apply in-

ternational law.8 7 The public policy of one nation may not be the public
policy of another nation, particularly in the areas of monetary policy and
commercial crime. 88 Further, ascertaining exactly what the public interest
is with regard to the application of the margin regulations to foreign

financial institutions is no easy matter, because it involves balancing at
least two conflicting public policies, namely encouraging foreign investment
in U.S. securities and preventing undue speculation in securities. 89 In view

of the increasing internationalization of commercial and financial affairs,
and the umbrage which other nations are apt to take at the extraterritorial
application of U.S. law, 90 the courts and federal agencies should pause
"21 Rec. supra note 7, at 248-49. The manner in which the antitrust laws have been
applied extraterritorially has been labelled by one commentator as "judicial aggression."
Whitney, Sources of Conflict between International Law and the Antitrust Laws, 63 YALE L.
J. 655,656 (1954).
8See
Dickenson, supra note 65. This tendency has been particularly marked in cases
involving the exercise of personal jurisdiction. See notes 100-07, infra. One of the fallacies of
subjecting foreign states in the international law sense to the same principles as "foreign"
U.S. states is that a truly foreign state is not bound by the "full faith and credit" clause of the
Constitution. Further, the courts of such civilized and legalistic countries as Canada and
Great Britain have refused to enforce, and even enjoined the enforcement of U.S. judgments
which in their view violated international law. United States v. First National City Bank; 379
U.S. 378, 395-96 (1965) (dissent); Whitney, supra note 84. This sort of judicial battle makes a
mockery of both U.S. and international law.
8Comment,
supra note 3, at 96-97.
87
Supra note 69. The national interest principle has been pushed to its extreme by
Communist theorists, who deny that international law is paramount to national law in any case
where it conflicts with national goals. Kelsen supra note 65. See GOODMAN, THE SOVIET
DESIGN FOR A WORLD STATE 112-22 (1960).
88
Comment, 70 YALE L. J. supra note 73, at 272-87. To take an extreme example, it is a
criminal offense to make a commercial profit under the laws of some countries. Address by
Evesy S. Rashba, 1958 ABA Proceedings, Section of Int'l & Comp. L. 55.
3See notes 6 and 7, supra.
9
Whitney, supra note 84. Although the Court stated, in United States v. First National
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before attempting to impose as complex and peculiarly American a regulatory scheme as the margin regulations on foreign financial institutions
without a clear Congressional mandate to do so. 91
B. The Exemption Provided by Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act
1. INTRODUCTION
Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act provides that
The provisions of this title or of any rule or regulation thereunder shall not
apply to any person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without
the jurisdiction of the United States, unless he transacts such business in
contravention of such rules and regulations as the Commission92may prescribe
as necessary or appropriate to prevent the evasion of this title.
No rules have been promulgated by the SEC under this section.
There are three types of separate (although related) jurisdictional concepts to which the phrase "without the jurisdiction of the United States"
could relate. First, for constitutional reasons, the securities acts generally
only apply to transactions involving the use of the facilities of interstate or
foreign commerce. Usually, this jurisdictional requisite to the application of
the securities laws exempts wholly intrastate transactions. 93 Congress similarly may have intended Section 30(b) to exempt wholly foreign transactions, where no facilities of interstate commerce, including the U.S. mails,
are used to consummate a securities transaction.
Second, a U.S. court or federal agency generally cannot subject a foreign
person or entity to its personal jurisdiction, unless the foreigner is present
in the United States. Since this is primarily a procedural, as opposed to a
substantive rule, it is doubtful that Section 30(b) is addressed to this
problem. In this connection, it should be noted that the jurisdictional
concepts of international law discussed above relate to subject matter, as
opposed to personal jurisdiction. Strictly speaking, international law only

City Bank, 379 U. S. 378, 384 (1965) that "overseas transactions are often caught in a web of
extraterritorial activities and foreign law beyond the ken of our federal courts or their
competence," it proceeded to render a judgment of foreclosure against a foreigner unenforceable in
the country where the judgment would have to be enforced. Id. at 395-96.
91
Cf. 21 Rec. supra note 7, at 253. See I1 Loss supra note 14 at 1269.
9215 U.S.C. 78dd(b).
93
Congressional concern about the constitutionality of the Exchange Act under the
commerce clause is evident from the legislative history. See, e.g., Stock Exchange Regulation,
supra note 19, at 15-42, 917-39. The constitutionality of Congressional legislation which
regulates wholly foreign commerce has not been subject to the same type of extensive
litigation as the constitutionality of Congressional legislation which regulates wholly intrastate
commerce. But see Skiriotes v. Florida, supra note 69; Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v. Pacific Far
East Line, Inc., supra note 81; 1. 0. S., Ltd., Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 8083, p. 9
(May 23, 1967).
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governs relations between states, and the extent to which an individual is a
proper subject of international law, having either generally recognized
rights or obligations, is unclear. 94 Accordingly, international law is not well
developed on the question of what objections a foreigner can make to a
tribunal's assertion of jurisdiction over him based on lack of personal
jurisdiction. Further, the Supreme Court has held that one brought into the
jurisdiction in violation of international law cannot question the right of a
95
court to try him.
Third, as discussed above, federal statutes generally are not applied
extraterritorially because such application offends principles of international law and the comity among nations. Therefore, a court or agency
would not have subject matter jurisdiction over such situations. While the
exemption of Section 30(b) probably has some relation to this principle,
there is nothing in the legislative history of the Exchange Act which would
indicate whether Congress was merely stating this principle, reversing the
presumption against extraterritorial application, or attempting to alter the
96
principle.
2. USE OF JURISDICTIONAL FACILITIES
In Securities and Exchange Commission v. Myers,97 a Canadian unregistered investment adviser who mailed materials from Canada to investors
in the United States was enjoined from conducting an investment advisory
business in this country. The defendant argued that he personally had
never made use of the United States mails or any facilities of interstate
commerce. The court held that his activities in Canada, including the
placing of advertisements in Canadian newspapers which solicited inquiries
from United States residents, were an indirect use of jurisdictional facilities.
In this connection, it should be noted that the floor of a national secu94
The traditional view of theorists of international law was that only sovereign states were
subjects of international law. 1. WHEATON, INTERNATIONAL LAW 38-42 (6th ED. 1969).
More recently, international law is moving toward wider recognition of the private individuals
rights and obligations under international law, 1. WHITEMAN, supra note 81, at 35-58, although Communist theorists refuse to acknowledge individuals as subjects of international
law. Remarks of Mr. Tunkin, I. 1960 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n, 568th meeting, 41 (A/C N.
4/Serv. A/1960). However, even under the view that states are the only subjects of international law, individuals are objects of international law and may be sanctioned for certain
illegal
9 5acts. I HYDE, supra note 65, at 33-36.
Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436, 444 (1886); Chandler v. United States, supra note 74. In
such a situation, any wrong done under international law is by one sovereign state to another,
rather than to the individual concerned. This principle was a matter of concern in the Eichman
case.96See Comment, 46 CORNELL L. Q. 326 (1961).
Comment, supra note 4, at 106. See Goldman & Magrino, supra note 4, at 1017-19.
97285 F. Supp. 743 (D. Md. 1968).
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rities exchange is itself a means or instrumentality of interstate commerce.

So are the "pink sheets" of the National Quotation Bureau, Inc. 9 8 Therefore, any transaction in a security listed on a national securities exchange
by a foreign bank would almost necessarily have to involve the use of

jurisdictional facilities, and the execution of an order in an o-t-c American
stock by an American broker-dealer probably would also involve the use of

jurisdictional facilities. 99
3. PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Generally, in order for a forum to assert personal jurisdiction over a
foreign person or corporation, the foreigner must have minimal contacts
with the jurisdiction, and requiring the foreigner to enter the jurisdiction
and defend the action cannot offend traditional ideas of fair play. 100 In
Securities and Exchange Commission v. VTR, Incorporated,011 the court
held that it had personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank which sold shares

of stock over the American Stock Exchange through an account at a
member firm, in alleged violation of Section 5 of the Securities Act of
1933. The bank had no place of business in the United States and did no

other business in the United States. It was served with process abroad
pursuant to the provisions of Rule 4(i)(l)(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 0 2 It should be noted that another foreign bank defendant in
this same action, which consented to the entry of a judgment, did not even
sell the securities in question or maintain any brokerage accounts in the
U.S., but merely allowed the securities to be delivered against payment to
9

United States v. Re, 336 F. 2d 306, 315-16 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 904
(1964); F. S. Johns & Company, Inc. Securities Exchange Act Rel. No. 7972, at 13 note 16
(Oct. 10, 1966).
99
See Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., supra note 4. In Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co.,
234 F. 2d 633, 641 (2d Cir.),cert.idenied, 352 U.S. 871 (1956), the Court observed that the
commerce power "is now generally interpreted to extend to all commerce, even intrastate and
entirely foreign commerce, which has a substantial effect on commerce between the states or
between the United States and foreign countries."
10 0 Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958); International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326
U.S. 310 (1945).
10139 F.R.D. 19 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
102
Rule 4(e) provides for extraterritorial service whenever a statute of the United States
authorizes the court to reach beyond its normal territorial limits. Rule 4(i) prescribes the
manner in which such service shall be effected in instances permitted by Rule 4(e). Section
22(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. 77v(a), provides for the service of process in
any district "of which the defendant is an inhabitant or wherever the defendant may be
found." The Advisory Committee's notes on Rule 4(i) specifically mention Section 22(a) of
the Securities Act as a statutory provision authorizing service in a foreign country. Advisory
Committee on Civil Rules of the Judicial Conference of the United States, 31 F.R.D. 587,625
(1963).
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its account at a U.S. bank.10 3 If this defendant had contested the action, it
is possible, but probably unlikely, that a court would have held that such
contacts with the U.S. were too minimal to warrant the exercise of personal jurisdiction. This is because the case involved illegal sales of listed
securities by Americans, where the foreign banks were intermediaries
designed to conceal the identities of the sellers, and in situations involving
such attempted evasions of U.S. law, the courts will reach very far in
l
asserting jtrisdiction.1 4
Further, the transacting of such business in the U.S. may amount to the
transacting of business by the principals of a foreign entity as individuals,
and expose them to prosecution as individuals. In the VTR, Incorporated
case, the directors of two foreign banks were individually enjoined from
further violations of the securities acts. One of them contested the court's
exercise of personal jurisdiction, but neither the court nor the parties
focused on the question of whether the nexus between a foreign bank and
the forum sufficient to impose jurisdiction was likewise sufficient to impose
jurisdiction over a director of the bank as an individual.
In United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 10 5 the U.S. government brought
an action against a Canadian bank as the executor of a Canadian citizen,
Klein, to recover income taxes, interest and penalties. Klein was the
managing director of a Canadian distiller, the exclusive distributing agent
for which was a Cuban corporation. The Cuban corporation entered into a
contract with a New York corporation to act as its subagent in distributing
whiskey in the U.S., and this New York corporation sold substantial
quantities of whiskey in the U.S., including New York, pursuant to the
contract. The Canadian corporation also shipped whiskey from Canada to
a sole proprietor in New York who re-exported it to American Army posts
in Europe, and paid the Cuban distributor for the whiskey. Klein insisted
that the sole proprietor share two-thirds of his profits with Klein's brotherin-law who resided in New York. Klein also made the New York corporation put various of his friends and relatives on the payroll.
The theory of the government's case was that the earnings of the U.S.
' 0 3Affidavit of Thomas F. Fox. There is some support for the proposition that the
delivery of a security constitutes a "sale" under the securities acts. See Creswell-Keith, Inc.
264 F.2d 76 (8th Cir. 1959).
v. Willingham,
104This matter ultimately resulted in criminal prosecution. Seven Charged with Illegal
Distribution,Sale of 85,000 UnregisteredVTR Shares, Wall St. J., Mar. 21, 1969, at 5, cols.
2-3.
105235 F. Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.), rev'd, 358 F.2d 239 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S.
919 (1966).
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sole proprietor and New York corporation paid to Klein's relatives and
friends were income taxable to Klein. However, the legal issue was whether personal jurisdiction over Klein's executor had properly been obtained
on the ground that Klein had transacted business in New York, either
personally or through agents, namely the New York corporation and U.S.
sole proprietor. The district court found that there was no evidence to
show that Klein, as an individual, transacted business in New York, and
dismissed the action. The Second Circuit reversed, holding that Klein did
transact business in the state, through the New York corporation and U.S.
sole proprietor, who acted as Klein's personal agents.
It is interesting to note that the district court stated that "the activities of
Klein as a corporate officer on behalf of the corporations do not constitute
the transaction of business by Klein individually.' 1 0 6 The Second Circuit
was apparently in agreement with this general legal statement. 10 7
4. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The cases interpreting Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act all turn on the
issue of subject matter jurisdiction.1 0 8 In order for a court to apply the
margin requirements to a foreign financial institution, it would be necessary
for the court to decide: (a) that it is appropriate to apply federal law, as
opposed to foreign law, under international and conflicts law to the transaction which is the basis of the action; and (b) that no exemption under
Section 30(b) is available.
In Kook v. Crang,l0 9 a Canadian broker-dealer, registered with the SEC
pursuant to Section 15 (b) of the Exchange Act, was held to be exempted
from the credit provisions in sales in Canada of a Canadian security to a
United States citizen. The court found that all of the essentials of the
transactions occurred without the United States and that the use of the
106235 F. Supp. at 348.
107358 F. 2d at 243. A director of the Arzi Bank was named as a defendant in the
criminal complaint against the bank, but not in the indictment, supra note I. He is named as a
co-conspirator in the indictment returned against Coggeshall & Hicks, supra note I. The
President of American Securities Co., a foreign broker-dealer, was named as a defendant in
United States v. Lerner, supra note I. The general manager of Weisscredit Bank was named
as a defendant in United States v. Weisscredit Banca Comerciale e D'Investimenti, supra
note 1.
X08There is a tendency on the part of many courts to assume that if a forum has personal
jurisdiction, it has subject matter jurisdiction as well. However, the issues involved in
determining subject matter and personal jurisdiction are very different, particularly in an
action instituted under the securities act in a federal court. If subject matter jurisdiction is
predicated upon a federal statute and some law other than the federal law is applicable to the
transaction, for example a foreign law, a court could be compelled to dismiss the action for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction. See Whitney, supra note 84.
109182 F. Supp. 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
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mails and telephone within the U.S. did not change the locale of the
transactions for choice of law purposes.
The question here is not whether there are contacts with the United States
sufficient to give this Court jurisdiction, no one questions that, but rather
whether Congress intended to make the statute applicable to these transactions. We hold that such was not the intention of the legislature and that
'jurisdiction' as used in Section 30(b) contemplates some necessary and
substantial act within the United States. 110
In Roth v. Fund of Funds,"' the Second Circuit, in a brief decision,
applied Section 16(b) of the Exchange Act to a Canadian mutual fund with
offices in Switzerlind for short swing profits made in a security listed on
the New York Stock Exchange. The court reasoned that since the securities transactions involved were executed on the New York Stock Exchange by New York brokers acting as agent for the fund, and payment for
the purchases was made through a New York bank, a Section 30(b)
exemption was not available. Kook v. Crang was distinguished on the
ground that the transactions involved there were effected outside the
United States on the Toronto Stock Exchange. By way of dictum, the
court also doubted "whether 'transacting a business in securities' can be
read to cover the Fund's activities of investing in securities."
The most extensive opinion interpreting Section 30(b) is Schoenbaum v.
Firstbrook,112 which was a suit by an American shareholder of a Canadian
corporation alleging violations of the antifraud provisions of the Exchange
Act 1 3 in the sale of a block of treasury stock to a Canadian corporation
and a Delaware corporation conducting business in New York, although a
wholly owned subsidiary of a French bank. Although the transaction in
question was essentially Canadian, the U.S. mails were used. The stock of
the Canadian company was listed and traded on the American Stock
Exchange, as well as the Toronto Stock Exchange. The court held that it
had subject matter jurisdiction over the action on two grounds: (a) the
securities acts are applicable extraterritorially where necessary to protect
American investors; and (b) Section 30(b) was not meant to exempt transactions that are conducted outside of the U.S. unless they are part of a
4
"business in securities."-11
"lid. at 390-9 1.
"Supra note 4.

12

Supra note 4.
1"Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10(b)(5) promulgated thereunder, 15
U.S.C.
§ 18j(b) and 17 C.F.R. 240.lOb-5.
114
This portion of the Court's holding in effect overruled Ferraioli v. Cantor, CCH Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. 91,615 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), which exempted under Section 30(b) a private sale in
Canada of controlling shares of a New York corporation. In Ferraioli, the Court reasoned that
if Congress specifically exempted foreign business in securities it intended to also exempt
isolated transactions.
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The sweeping language of this decision is tantamount to a repeal of
Section 30(b). The Court stated:
We believe that Congress intended the Exchange Act to have extraterritorial
application in order to protect domestic investors who have purchased foreign
securities on American exchanges and to protect the domestic securities
market from the effects of improper foreign transactions in American securities. In our view, neither the usual presumption against extraterritorial
application of legislation nor the specific language of Section 30(b) show
Congressional intent to preclude application of the Exchange Act to transactions regarding stocks traded in the United States which are effected outside
application of the Act is necessary to
the United States, when extraterritorial
115
protect American investors.
This decision is subject to criticism on a number of grounds. First, the
Court assumes that any transaction in an American security affects a
national public interest, and therefore any transaction which would be in
violation of the securities acts if effected within the U.S. is intended to
produce and produces detrimental effects if effected without the U.S., and
therefore may constitute a claim for relief in a federal court. The Court's
analysis distorts the "plain meaning" of Section 30(b) 116 by reducing it to
situations where either a court would have no jurisdiction because no
facilities of commerce are used, or where transactions are effected over a
foreign securities exchange. In part, the Court justifies its tour de force of
statutory construction by relying on the title of Section 30, namely "Foreign Securities Exchanges." This reliance is unjustified because (a) the title
of a statute is not properly a part thereof and should not be considered in
ascertaining the meaning of a statute; 1 7 and (b) the title of Section 30
preceded the drafting of Section 30(b) and refers only to the provisions of
Section 30(a). 118
Faced with an analogous problem of statutory construction, the Court of
Appeals of New York held that the language conferring personal jurisdiction over a non-domiciliary in the New York "long-arm" statute " 'if, in
person or through an agent, he * * * commits a tortious act within the
state'- is too plain and precise to permit it to be read, as has the Appelate
Division, as if it were synonymous with 'commits a tortious act without the
115405 F.2d at 206.
16
1 1t has been persuasively argued that to interpret "jurisdiction of the United States" to
mean anything other than "territory of the United States" makes Section 30(b) into a
meaningless provision. 69 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 104-05. On the other hand, few
legal concepts are as ambiguous or as variously used as that of "jurisdiction." LEFLAR, THE
LAW OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 4 (1959).
117
Patterson v. Bark Endora, 190 U.S. 169, 172-73 (1903); United States v. Mouyas, 42
F.2d 743 (S.D.N.Y. 1930).
11869 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 106.
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state which causes injury within the state.' The mere occurrence of the
injury in this State certainly cannot serve to transmute an out-of-state
tortious act into one committed here within the sense of the statutory
wording." 19
Second, although the Court states in Schoenbaum that if the wrong
alleged also constitutes the basis for a cause of action under foreign law a
district court might decline to exercise its jurisdiction under the doctrine of
forum non conveniens,120 this thought is not carried to its logically proper
conclusion, namely that if the acts alleged are legal under foreign law, the
2
court should decline to exercise jurisdiction for reasons of comity.' '
Third, the Second Circuit's exclusion of the defendants as persons
transacting a business in securities is inconsistent on its face as applied to
one of the defendants, namely Paribas Corporation of New York, the
Delaware corporation [hereinafter referred to as "Paribas"]. According to
the Court, the phrase "person who transacts a business in securities" is a
broader phrase than "broker-dealer" because it also includes banks. The
decision rereflects that Paribas is a wholly owned subsidiary of a French
banking institution which acted as a broker with respect to the transaction
on which the action was based. Paribas purchased the shares in question
on behalf of another subsidiary of Paribas' parent for resale to ten European professional investors. There is no justification for the court's
22
apparent finding that this was an isolated foreign securities transaction.1
Fourth, the Court paid virtually no attention to the issues of international law necessarily involved in its decision, but limited itself to
interpreting Section 30(b). Inasmuch as the only cases which have arisen
under Section 30(b) have been in actions in the Southern District of New
York, 23 and Schoenbaum was the first case to be appealed to the Second
Circuit, it is unfortuante that the Court chose to slough off an important
119 Longines-Wittnauer Watch Co., Inc. v. Barnes & Reinecke, 15 N.Y. 2d 443, 460, 209
N.E. 2d 68, 72 (1965).
120405 F.2d at 209, note 5.
12t Although the doctrine of forum non conveniens may have some relevance to actions
against corporate directors under Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act, it has no real relevance
to the issue of whether a court should apply federal law to activities occuring outside the
United States. Even assuming that the jurisdictional issues depend on conflict of law principles, different considerations are pertinent to conflicts between states of the U. S. and
conflicts between U.S. and foreign law. See EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 16-21, 120-59
(1962).22
1 1t should be noted that Paribas is registered as a broker-dealer with the SEC. File No.
8-8994-1.
See Paribas Corporation, 40 S.E.C. 482 (1961).
12 3
Fontaine v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 4 1, was an action for an
injunction and declaratory judgment based on Section 30(b), but the court only indirectly
ruled on the Section 30(b) issue because it dismissed the action under the doctrines of
exhaustion of administrative remedies and primary jurisdiction.
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issue which had been a source of concern to the district court. 124 Further,
by failing to interpret Section 30(b) in terms of existing principles of
international law, the Court ignored a formidable body of Supreme Court
125
case law.
5. DIFFERENCES BETWEEN REGULATIONS T AND G
If a foreign financial institution is acting as a broker-dealer so as to be
subject to Regulation T, there would appear to be no doubt that it is
transacting a business in securities under Section 30(b) of the Exchange
Act. However, if a foreign financial institution is merely making purpose
loans, so as to be more properly covered by Regulation G, if subject to the
credit regulations at all, the question arises as to whether the foreign lender
is transacting a business in securities.
In the Schoenbaum case, the Court stated:
The purpose of this subsection is to permit persons in the securities business
to conduct transactions in securities outside of the United States without
complying with the burdensome reporting requirement of the Act and without
being subject to its regulatory provisions, except insofar as the Commission
finds it necessary and appropriate to regulate such transactions to prevent
evasion of the Act.... The exemption relieves the Commission of the impossible task of enforcing American Securities law upon persons whom it could
for actions upon which it could not
not subject to the sanctions of the Act
126
bring its investigatory powers to bear.
Although a Regulation G lender is not subject to the same detailed
regulation as a Regulation T lender, Regulation G is nevertheless a comprehensive regulatory scheme, which is dovetailed to Regulations T and U.
Accordingly, there would appear to be the same reasons for exempting a
foreign Regulation'G lender from the provisions of the Exchange Act,
pursuant to Section 30(b), as for exempting-a Regulation T lender.
Further, it would appear that if foreign financial institutions are not
subject to Regulation T because of the operation of Section 30(b), they
could not for this reason be made subject to Regulation G because it was
intended to cover lenders not previously captured by the margin regu127
lations.
C. The Defense of Sovereign Immunity
Traditionally, a sovereign was entitled to absolute immunity from suit in
the courts of a foreign jurisdiction.12 8 Further, the United States Supreme
124268 F. Supp. 385, 392-94 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
125Text at notes 142-76 infra.
126405
1 27

F.2d at 207.

Supra notes 54-64. See text at notes 226-49, infra.
THE EXCHANGE, II U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812).

12 8
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Court, in applying this doctrine, made no distinciton between public and
private (or commercial) activities of a foreign sovereign. 129 In this connection, an agency or corporation of a foreign government may be deemed
an extension of the sovereign entitled to immunity from suit.130
In 1952, the Department of State announced a policy of adhering to a
more restrictive view of sovereign immunity, and urged that U.S. courts
exercise jurisdiction over suits arising out of the private acts of foreign
sovereigns. The rationale for this policy was that "the widespread and
increasing practice on the part of governments engaging in commercial
activities makes necessary a practice which will enable persons doing
business with them to have their rights determined in the courts. 13 Since
1952, the courts have therefore limited the application of sovereign immunity for foreign governments, but the Supreme Court has not yet reversed its
previous holding that foreign sovereigns are immune from suit with regard
32
to their private or commercial activities.
The issue of whether a foreign financial institution which is an instrumentality of a foreign sovereign would or should be subject to prosecution by the U.S. government is an interesting and troublesome one.
Although an action by the United States under the antitrust laws was
maintained against a commercial venture established by the French government, 33 sovereign immunity was accorded to an English corporation
established by the British government to insure an oil supply for the British
Fleet.' 34 In the latter case, the Court held that the corporation was engaged
in governmental rather than commercial activities.
Whether a national bank is a commercial trading operation or a government instrumentality would appear to be a question to which there is not a
clear-cut answer. 135 However, the possibility that certain foreign financial
institutions could legitimately raise a defense of sovereign immunity ought
to be given some consideration in determining whether the margin regulations should be made generally applicable to foreign banks. It would
129

Berizzi Bros. Co. v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).

0

13 INVESTIGATION OF WORLD ARRANGEMENTS WITH RELATION TO THE PRODUCTION,

TRANSPORTATION, REFINING AND DISTRIBUTION OF PETROLEUM, 113 F.R.D. 280,

290-91

(D.D.C. 1952); Section 66, RESTATEMENT, supra note 83. But see United States v.
Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, 31 F.2d 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1929).
Dep't State Bull. 984, 985 (1952).
13126
132See National'City Bank v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1955); 6 Whiteman,
supra note 81, at 553-584, 674-95.
133 34 United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft, supra note 130.
1 INVESTIGATION OF WORLD ARRANGEMENTS, supra note 130.
13 5
Compare McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S.(4 Wheat.)316 (1819), with United States
Bank v. Planter's Bank 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 904 (1824). See Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la
Republica Argentina, 38 Misc. 2d 128, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499 (Sup. Ct. 1963); Ulen & Co. v.
Bank Gospodarstwa Krajowego, 261 App. Div. 1, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201 (2d Dep't 1940).
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appear that the activities of such banks to which the margin regulations
would be applicable are private rather than public, and thus under the
restricted view of sovereign immunity favored by the Department of State,
a defense of sovereign immunity should be rejected. Nevertheless, the

rationale for this State Department policy is not relevant to an action
instituted by the U.S. government as opposed to a private litigant. The
injury which such an action would seek to redress is to the U.S. economy.

If such an injury has been caused by an agent of a foreign sovereign, a
federal court would appear to be the wrong forum in which to obtain relief,
at least if the United States or the SEC is the plaintiff.
Although sovereign immunity has become an unpopular defense, partic-

ularly where it is raised in the context of ordinary commercial enterprises,
the basis for the doctrine in international law coalesces with and is related
to various other doctrines which militate against the application of U.S. law
136
to foreign entities which are closely related to their own governments.

This would be true of many foreign financial institutions. It has, for example, been suggested that the application of Section 30(b) of the Ex-

change Act to persons transacting a business in securities may have been
an expression of Congressional sensitivity to resentment by foreign countries of U.S. interference with the way in which investment banking is
137
conducted abroad.

D. The Extraterritorial Application of Other Statutes
The tendency toward increasing government regulation of commerce in
significant sectors of the economy, pursuant to broadly phrased federal
legislation, and the tendency toward increasing transnationalism in com-

mercial affairs have resulted in numerous court cases involving the extraterritorial application of U.S. law. Cases of this type usually involve the

application of two conflicting canons of statutory construction, namely, the
136

An analogous area of international law which may serve to bring this problem into
focus is that of the flag law doctrine. Traditionally, a flag ship was regarded as the floating
territory of the flag state, and the sovereign was personally identified with his ships of war.
This was one reason warships were entitled to the defense of sovereign immunity. See THE
EXCHANGE, supra note 128. During a voyage, the sovereign's jurisdiction was delegated to the
captain of a vessel. COLOMBos, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA § 317 (4th ed. 1959).
Accordingly, the courts of one country ordinarily declined to interfere with the internal order
of a foreign flag ship. Patterson v. Bark Eudora, supra note 117; Wildenhus's Case, 120 U.S.
I, 12 (1886). Although modern courts recognize these concepts to be legal fictions, they
connote important foreign policy considerations. In McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, 372
U.S. 10 (1963), the Supreme Court refused to apply the National Labor Relations Act, 29
U.S.C. § 141 et seq., to disputes involving foreign flag ships on the grounds that such an
application of the law would be extraterritorial and in violation of international law, and
further, would be contrary to the flag law and internal order doctrines.
13769 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 106. Cf. S. J. Rundt & Associates, supra note I.
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presumption against the extraterritorial application of federal law, and the
presumption in favor of the liberal application of a remedial statute.' 3 8
Further, legislative intent regarding a statute's application to activities
abroad is rarely expressed with any specificity, since Congress is primarily
concerned with domestic conditions.' 3 9 In addition, many of these cases
have had domestic and foreign political underpinnings 40 which do not
support judicial resolution through philosophical concepts which strike the
41
contemporary mind as no more than quaint legal fictions.'
The resulting record of the courts in cases involving the application of
federal law to acts which take place outside the territorial limits of the
United States has been so inconsistent that any prediction as to whether,
or to what extent, the Supreme Court would give extraterritorial effect to
the securities acts would be extremely conjectural. An apogee in judicial
vacillation in this area was reached by the Supreme Court during its 1948
term. In Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell,'42 the Court applied the Fair
Labor Standards Act 4 3 to employees of government contractors engaged
in the production of goods on a leasehold of the United States in Bermuda.
In Foley Bros. v. Filardo,144 the Court declined to apply the Eight Hour
Law 145 to a cook employed by a government contractor for work on
construction projects in Iraq and Iran. In his concurring opinion in the
Foley case, Mr. Justice Frankfurter, who had dissented in Vermilya-Brown, remarked that he was able to join in the result only because
he did not feel bound by Vermilya-Brown since it had been handed down
during the same term. 146 Even such noted jurists as Mr. Justice Holmes
and Judge Learned Hand have written opinions regarding the extraterritorial application of U.S. law which, although distinguishable, appear
47
to rest upon divergent premises.
' 38 Compare Kook v. Crang, supra note 109, with Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, supra note
4. See text at notes 70-72, 108-15, supra. The case most frequently cited in recent years for
the proposition that the securities acts should be liberally construed to accomplish their
remedial purpose is Securities and Exchange Commission v. Capital Gains Bureau, 375 U.S.
180, 13
195
(1963).
9
Vermilya-Brown Co. v. Connell, 335 U.S. 377, 385 (1948).
40
1 See notes 167-76, infra.
14
'Cases involving the application of maritime law are a prime example, and many of the
principles of international law are moored to the maritime law of a more simplistic age. See
note 14136,
supra.
2
Supra note 139.
14329 U.S.C. § 201 et seq.
144336 U.S. 281 (1949)
14540 U.S.C. § 324.
146336 U.S. at 291. The discrepancies between the two decisions were further highlighted
by United
States v. Spellar, 338 U.S. 217 (1949).
14 7
Compare Uravic v. F. Jarka Co., 282 U.S. 234 (1931), with American Banana v.
United Fruit Co., supra note 72. Compare also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America,
supra note 80, with Kyriakos v. Goulandris, 151 F.2d 132, 139 (2d Cir. 1945) (dissent).
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The difficult and theoretical jurisdictional principles utilized to decide
these cases have obscured rather than clarified the basis upon which
decisions have been made. To some extent, this is because the courts have
frequently honored in the breach the principle that international law limits
the extent to which one country can regulate conduct which occurs beyond
its borders.
A relatively early case 148 arose out of an action against the master of a
French schooner for patent infringement of a device useful in the gaff of
sailing vessels. The question presented for decision was whether any improvement in the construction or equipment of a foreign vessel, placed on
the vessel in a foreign port, for which a U.S. patent has been obtained,
could be used by such vessel within the jurisdiction of the U.S., without
the consent of the patentee. The Supreme Court decided this question
affirmatively and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that although Congress could have conditioned the entry of foreign vessels, under its commerce clause powers, upon compliance with the patent laws, the patent
laws were passed under the power of Congress to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts, which power was domestic in its character, and
necessarily confined within the limits of the U.S. The Court further felt
that the literal construction of the statute urged by the plaintiff would give
patentees political power, enabling them to interfere with the treaty making
powers of Congress.
Similarly, in American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 49 the plaintiff
sued for treble damages under the Sherman Act 50 for monopolization of
the Central American banana trade. Mr. Justice Holmes, speaking for the
Court and dismissing the complaint, said that since "the acts causing the
damage were done, so far as it appears, outside the jurisdiction of the
United States ...it is surprising to hear it argued that they were governed
15
by the act of Congress.' '
A directly opposite approach was taken by the Supreme Court and Mr.

Justice Holmes in Uravic v. F. Jarka Co.,' 5 2 which arose under the Jones
Act.' 53 Under the general language of the statute, a wrongful death action
was granted to the personal representative of "any seaman" killed by an
148 Brown v. Duchesne, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 183 (1856). At this period of history, American judges were more inclined toward judicial abnegation than their English brethren. Compare Caldwell
v. Vanvlissenger, 9 Hare 415, 68 Eng. Rep. 571 (Ch. 1851).
149Supra note 72.
15015 U.S.C. §§ 1-7.
151213 U.S. at 355.
15 2Supra note 147.

15346 U.S.C. § 688.
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injury suffered in the course of employment. The decedent was an American stevedore whose death was caused by an injury received while unloading a German flag ship in New York harbor. To the contention that seamen
on foreign vessels were not specifically included in the act and could not
therefore be covered by its provisions, the Court responded: "But the
question is not whether they were thought of for the purpose of inclusion,
but whether they were intentionally excluded from a description that on its
face includes them."1 54 A judgment for the decedent's administrator was
rendered.
Neither the Banana nor Uravic cases have been overruled, but over the
years since they were decided both the Sherman Act and the Jones Act
have been selectively applied to activities of both American and foreign
nationals abroad. The Sherman Act cases are so complex, both factually
and legally, that it is very difficult to set forth a standard which
differentiates those cases where the Sherman Act was given extraterritorial
effect and those cases where it was not. 155 However, most of the cases
involve acts abroad by American corporations, or the subsidiaries or parents of American corporations, or acts within the United States by foreign
corporations. Nevertheless, at least in theory, the antitrust laws could be
applied to conspiracies between foreign competitors alone where they are
intended to, and actually do, result in substantial anti-competitive effects
on American foreign commerce.' 56 The notion that foreign activities having
a sufficiently substantial impact on American commerce justify the application of American law to foreigners is an aberration from the general
standard, even in anti-trust cases, and statements to this effect have been
157
severely criticized.
154282 U.S. at 239.

155
The cases in this area are set forth and analyzed in 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 81, at
118-160. They have been collected and reported in full in the Appendix to International
Aspects of Antitrust, Hearings Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the
89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1967).
Senate
15 6Committee on the Judiciary,
Report of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws
76-77, March 31, 1955. Cf. Section 18, RESTATEMENT, supra note 83.
157Supra notes 81 and 84. The facts of the leading cases do not go as far as the language
sometimes used by the courts, for reasons peculiar to the antitrust laws. One of the cases most
frequently relied upon to justify the extraterritorial application of American law, Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951), involved a conspiracy between a
U. S. corporation and two foreign subsidiaries. Although the court undoubtedly was
influenced in finding that it had jurisdiction to apply the antitrust laws to the conspiracy by the
interest of the American corporation in the foreign corporations, it was constrained not to
collapse these legal entities into an ultimate U. S. person because this could have had the
effect of destroying the conspiracy between them. Nevertheless, in other fields the court has
likewise refused to look behind the incorporation of a foreign entity to ultimate U. S.
ownership and control, when it could have done so in order to apply federal law extraterritorially. McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, supra note 136.
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In Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 158 the Supreme Court applied the Lan-

ham Trade-Mark Act of 1946159 to award relief to an American corporation against acts of trademark infringement and unfair competition consummated in Mexico by a citizen and resident of the United States. In so
doing, the Court primarily relied on the nationality exception to the rule
that legislation should not be applied extraterritorialy. The Court also felt
that the defendant's activities could have an adverse effect on U.S., as well
as foreign, markets. Finally, the Court found that since Mexico had nullified the defendant's trademark registration, no interference with the sovereignty of another nation was involved. The Court disregarded as immaterial the fact that all of the elements of the violation occurred abroad by
linking the defendant's acts abroad to certain acts in the U.S. and categorizing his conduct as "a device [to] evade the thrust of the laws of the
United States in a privileged sanctuary beyond our borders." 160
In Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., 1 6 1 the Second Circuit refused to
extend the holding of the Steele case or apply the Lanham Act to the
activities of Canadians in Canada. The Court viewed the Steele case as
being based on the power of the U.S. to govern the conduct of its own
citizens, and then only when the rights of other nations or their nationals
62
are not infringed.1
A noteworthy effort to give selective extraterritorial effect to the Jones
Act was made by the Supreme Court in Lauritzen v. Larsen. 63 The Court
recognized the problem of determining whether a federal statute should
determine rights and liabilities prima facie regulated by the statute, where
the United States and a foreign country possess concurrent jurisdiction
over the action, as falling into the category of conflict of laws, and Mr.
Justice Jackson set forth a standard for resolving the conflict which was
subsequently dubbed the "substantial contacts" test. 164 This test valued
points of contact between the transaction and the states whose competing
laws are involved, and weighed the significance of one or more connecting
factors between the transaction regulated and the national interest served
158344 U.S. 280 (1952).
15915 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq.

160344 U.S. at 287. The dissenting justices were of the view that the acts of the defendant
within the United States were not illegal, and his acts abroad were not within the control of
Congress. 344 U.S. at 291-92.
161 Supra note 100.
162234 F.2d at 642-43.
163345 U.S. 571 (1953).
164

Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., 263 F.2d 437 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359
U.S. 1000 (1959).
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by the assertion of authority. 6 5 The difficulty with this standard is its
166
uncertainty, and the inconsistent results to which it can lead.
The variety of different contentions and considerations which can go
into a determination of whether to give extraterritorial effect to federal
legislation is demonstrated by a series of Supreme Court cases concerning
the applicability of the National Labor Relations Act to the Panlibhon
fleet.' 67 The factual and political background to these cases was efforts by
American labor unions to organize the crews of foreign flag ships which
had been built and organized abroad by American shipowners. In Benz v.
Compania Naviera Hidalgo, SA.,' 68 the Supreme Court refused to apply
the National Labor Relations Act to bar the power of a federal district
court to award damages against an American union which struck a Panlibhon shipper, where the contacts of the plaintiff's vessel with American
commerce were irregular and insubstantial. However, in Marine Cooks v.
Panama Steamship Co.' 69 the Supreme Court held that the Norris-LaGuardia Act 70 prohibited a federal district court from enjoining the
shoreside picketing of a foreign flag ship. In the interim, the National
Labor Relations Board [hereinafter referred to as "NLRB"] assumed jurisdiction over labor disputes involving Panlibhon vessels where their con17
tacts with American commerce were regular and substantial.
The jurisdiction of the NLRB to assume jurisdiction over controversies
with foreign flag ships was ultimately tested in McCulloch v. Sociedad
Nacional. 72 The McCulloch case originated in a petition by the National
Maritime Union filed with the NLRB against United Fruit Company, a
New Jersey corporation which was the sole stockholder of a Honduran
corporation which owned a Honduran flag ship. The Union sought to be
certified as the representative of the unlicensed foreign seamen aboard the
Honduran flag ship. The Supreme Court held that the coverage of the
National Labor Relations Act was limited to American workingmen, and
that the NLRB's exercise of jurisdiction over foreign flag ships had created
165345

U.S. at 582.

'" 6Compare Gkiafis v. Steamship Yiosonas, 387 F.2d 460 (4th Cir. 1967), with Anastasiadis v. S. S. Little John, 346 F.2d 281 (5th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 920 (1966).
See Karros v. S/S Liryc, 247 F. Supp. 554 (E.D. Va. 1965); Moutzouris v. National
Shipping
& Trading Co., 194 F. Supp. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1961).
16 7
See Comment, 36 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1342 (1961); Comment, 69 YALE L.J. 498 (1960);
supra note 136.
168353 U.S. 138 (1957).
169362 U.S. 365 (1960).
17029 U.S.C. §§ 101-15.
17 1
West India Fruit & S. S. Co., 130 N.L.R.B. 343 (1961).

172Supra note 136.
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international discord. The Court rejected the NLRB's adoption of the
"substantial contacts" test of Lauritzen v. Larsen on the ground that it
"would inevitably lead to embarrassment in foreign affairs and be entirely

173
infeasible in actual practice."
In the McCulloch case, the position of the NLRB was opposed in
amicus curiae briefs filed by the United States (on behalf of the Department of State) and the Governments of the United Kingdom and the
Republic of Honduras. The position of the NLRB was supported in an
amicus curiae brief filed by the American Federation of Labor and Congress of Industrial Organizations. The Court was unanimous in accepting
the views of the State Department over those of organized labor and the
174
NLRB.
The views of the State Department, when expressed in cases of this
type, are influential. Further, where such views are ignored, they may
ultimately prevail in Congress. In Vermilya-Brown v. Connell,175 where the
Court rejected foreign policy consideration urged by the State Department,
Congress amended the Fair Labor Standards Act to agree with the views
of the State Department, and in effect reversed the Supreme Court's
176
decision.
What the foregoing cases portend regarding the extraterritorial application of the securities acts is difficult to predict. If precedents from the
anti-trust field are relied upon, the margin regulations could be made
applicable to foreign financial institutions on the ground that their lending
activities have a substantial effect on the volume of credit in the U.S.
securities markets. 177 Further, Congress presumably could condition trading in American securities markets upon compliance with the margin regulations, particularly where such trading is effected on behalf of U.S. citizens or residents. 178 The crucial question then becomes whether Congress

173372 U.S. at 19.
174 Mr. Justice Douglass, in a concurring opinion, stated that he had expressed his views
in his dissenting opinion in Benz v. Compania Naviera Hidalgo, S.A., and he was therefore
bowing to the "inexorable extension" of the Benz case by joining in the result. 372 U.S. at 23.
175Supra note 139.
17674 Stat. 417 (1960).
177Congress did not have sufficient information to make such a finding when it enacted
the Exchange Act, note 24, supra, and the SEC Special Study contains no such data, note 56,
supra. Whether the lending activities of a single foreign financial institution are sufficiently
substantial to affect the U. S. economy seems questionable. A determination as to whether the
effect of loans made by foreign lenders generally is substantial would appear to fall within the
expertise of the SEC or Federal Reserve Board, rather than a court faced with a single action.
However, such a determination appears more appropriate to the rule-making rather than the
prosecuting or adjudicatory functions of the agencies. See text at notes 226-49, infra.
17
8Cf. Brown v. Duchesne, supra note 148; Fontaine v. Securities and Exchange Commission, supra note 4 1.
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intended to do so by the language of Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act.
This is essentially the approach which has been taken by the Second,
179
Circuit in applying the Exchange Act to foreign acitvities.
On the other hand, if the experience of the NLRB in attempting to assert
jurisdiction over foreign flag ships is taken as a guide, an attempt by the
SEC to assert jurisdiction over foreign financial institutions in their dealings with foreigners could be denounced by the Courts, particularly if the
Department of State chooses to express a point of view contrary to the
SEC. In this connection it should be noted that the Treasury Department's
position that increased foreign investment in U.S. securities is necessary to
improve the country's balance-of-payments' 80 would only indirectly be
contravened by a holding that foreign financial institutions must comply
with the margin requirements in their dealings with Americans. 18'
E. Factual Considerations-Differences in the Activities of Foreign
FinancialInstitutions
One reason it is difficult to predict how Section 30(b) of the Exchange
Act will be interpreted relative to the imposition of the margin requirements on foreign financial institutions is that the practices of such insituations in lending money on U.S. securities vary widely. At one extreme, a foreign bank may purchase securities through an omnibus account
at a member firm for American customers, and extend credit to such
customers for the purpose of purchasing such securities on easier terms
than the margin regulations permit, and use the securities purchased to
collateralize such loans. These were the alleged facts underlying the indictments against Arzi Bank, A.G., American Securities Co. and Weisscredit Bank. 18 2 Since the banks had voluntarily agreed to abide by the margin
regulations, 8 3 they are in a poor position to contest being subjected to
a84
such regulations.
At the other ex'reme, a foreign financial institution may extend credit to
9

17 1n Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., and Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, supra note 4, the
Second Circuit cited precedents from the antitrust area in giving extraterritorial effect to the
Exchange Act, and particularly relied upon United States v. Aluminum Company of America,
supra note 80.
' 80See note 6, supra.
18 1
The recommendations of the Fowler Report are all designed to increase truly foreign
investment in U. S. securities. However, a campaign to apply the margin regulations to foreign
financial institutions in any way could dampen the enthusiasm of such institutions for investing in U. S. securities. See S. J. Rundt & Associates, supra note 1.
182Supra note 1.
1' 3See text at notes 45-48, supra. Since July 8, 1969, a foreign financial institution may
not open
an omnibus account unless it is registered as a broker-dealer with the SEC.
184Arzi Bank, A.G. pleaded guilty to the indictment against it and was fined $2,500.
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foreigners abroad, in loans collateralized by U.S. securities, for the purpose
of purchasing or carrying such securities, and the foreign financial institution may not even maintain a brokerage account at a U.S. firm. 185 In
such a situation, although an argument could be made in favor of applying
the margin regulations to this transaction, 186 it would be difficult to justify
such an application under customary principles of international law or any
reasonable interpretation of Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act.
A more common situation, however, is that of the foreign financial
institution which maintains either a cash or margin account at a U.S. firm,
through which it purchases U.S. securities for customers and extends
credit to such customers for the purpose of purchasing such securities on
easier terms than the margin regulations permit, and uses the securities
purchased to collateralize such loans. In such a situation, the foreign
financial institution would appear to be acting as a broker, and therefore
187
fall within the literal definition of a "creditor" under Regulation T.
Further, since its purchases are effected in the U.S. securities markets, a
court could find that such brokerage transactions are "within" the jurisdiction of the United States, even if the foreign institution places its orders
abroad, either at a foreign branch office of a U.S. broker, or through some
facility of foreign commerce such as a telex communication.' 8 8 On the
other hand, if the loan transaction is executed abroad, a court could find
that the extension of credit which is the gravamen of any violation of the
margin regulations, is "without" the jurisdiction of the United States.
Whether the collateral for the loan is physically maintained within or
outside the United States could be a relevant, but not necessarily a controlling, factor. Likewise, a court could find that even the brokerage transaction is effected "without" the jurisdiction of the United States if the
contract to purchase the securities between the foreign institution and its
customer is made abroad.
In this type of a case, a court's predilections in determining the law to
apply in ordinary conflict of laws questions in contract cases could
influence its findings as to whether the brokerage and/or loan transactions
of a foreign bank are within or without the United States. Unfortunately,
this is an area where any of the following principles could be applied: (1)
place where the contract is executed; (2) place where the contract is to be
185 Nevertheless, such a situation probably would involve delivery of the securities
against payment to a bank in the United States for the account of the foreign bank. Cf.
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer,
Inc. v. Transamerica Corporation, supra note 64.
186See text at note 220, infra. See also text at notes 10 1-04, supra.
187
1 88Text at notes 25-26, supra. See 11Loss, supra note 14, at 1240, note 1.
Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., supra note.4.
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performed; (3) intent of the parties; or (4) center of gravity. 189 The most
commonly followed rule in the case of brokerage contracts is the place of
performance, which would be the United States. 190 However, the most
commonly followed rule in the case of loan contracts, is the intent of the
parties, and absent such expressed intent, the place where the loan instrument is signed. 19' If precedents are gathered from cases involving
assertedly usurious contracts, which could possibly be considered analogous, almost any choice of law could be justified, since the courts tend to
uphold such contracts unless they violate a strong public policy of the
192
forum.
Although conflict of law principles have influenced courts in determining
the extraterritorial application of federal legislation,' 93 cases arising under
"long-arm" service-of-process statutes and turning on the issue of personal
jurisdiction are possibly more pertinent. This is because the jurisdictional
hook of such statutes is frequently the transacting of business "within" the
jurisdiction by the defendant. Presumably, if the defendant was found not
to be transacting business "within" the jurisdiction, he was transacting
business "without" the jurisdiction, in the same sense as the word "with94
out" is used in Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act.'
In Boas & Associates v. Vernier,195 a business broker and industrial
consultant sued the principal stockholder and chief executive officer of a
French corporation for commissions earned pursuant to an oral contract in
introducing the defendant to certain French underwriters leading to a
merger of two French corporations. The court held that there was no
evidence that the defendant transacted business within the State under the
New York "long-arm" statute, and dismissed for lack of jurisdiction:
89

1 Leflar, supra note 116, at §§ 121-29. See generally EHRENZWEIG, supra note 121, at

453-511.
19 0
Gratz v. Claughton, 187 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,. 341 U.S. 920 (1951)
(relied upon by the district court in Roth v. Fund of Funds, Ltd., 279 F. Supp. 935 (S.D.N.Y.
1968), aff d supra note 4); MEYER, THE LAW OF STOCK BROKERS AND STOCK EXCHANGES
§ 181 (193 1). In the case of transactions over a securities exchange, the law of the place of the
exchange is regarded as the best and is the most common choice of law no matter what theory
is utilized in selecting this law. See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 12 1, at 524, 532.
t 9t
Leflar, supra note 116, at § 133. Banking transactions are generally governed by the
law where the bank is located, and there are important policy considerations for adhering
strictly
to this rule. Ehrenzweig, supra note 121, at 523-24.
192
1d., at 482-85; Leflar, supra note 116, at § 13 1.
93
1 Lauritzen v. Larsen, supra note 173.
19 4
The Railway Labor Act was held inapplicable to employees of domestic airlines flying
between points outside the United States because the jurisdiction of the Railway Labor Board
is limited to carriers engaged in transportation "within" the United States. Air Line Stewards
v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 267 F.2d 170 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 901 (1959).
19522 App. Div. 2d 561, 257 N.Y.S. 2d 487 (1st Dep't 1965) (per curiam).
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In the absence of any showing that the oral agreement with defendant was
negotiated or concluded by defendant in New York, or that defendant did any
other act with respect to the oral agreement in New York, it cannot be said
that the causes of action arose from an act of defendant in the transaction of
business within the State. . . . The fact that a prior'written agreement [nego-

tiated and executed in New York] was historically necessary to the inception
of the subsequent oral agreement does not alone, for purposes of the jurisdiction statute, support personal jurisdiction.
This same logic perhaps could be used to contend that a loan by a foreign
bank to a customer is not transacted within the United States, even if the
purchase of a U.S. security is necessary to the transaction.
One factor which could determine whether the margin requirements are
applied to a foreign financial institution is whether the customer of the
institution is a U.S. or foreign national. Since the margin regulations are
directed at the lender, rather than the borrower, the assertion of jurisdiction over a foreign bank which extends credit to U.S. citizens or residents
cannot be justified under the nationality exception to the territorial principle of international law. 196 However, a distinction between U.S. and
foreign borrowers could be justified under the objective territorial theory,
particularly as extended by the antitrust cases. Where a foreign bank deals
with a U.S. borrower, it can be argued that such transactions have a more
direct, foreseeable and substantial effect within the United States which is
in contravention of the objectives of the margin regulations. 19 7 Further,
given the expense and inconvenience of effecting securities transactions
through foreign banks, the majority of such transactions are more obviously intended to evade the margin requirements or some other U.S. law.
For this reason, and because the margin regulations were intended, in part,
to protect U.S. borrowers against themselves, the United States would
appear to have a more legitimate interest in attempting to regulate such
transactions than in attempting to regulate transactions between foreign
lenders and foreign borrowers.' 98 Additionally, the affront to the sovereignty of another nation, on a practical, if not a theoretical level, is not as
great if the United States attempts to regulate relationships between its
citizens and foreign banks as it would be if the United States attempted to
regulate relationships between foreign nationals and foreign banks.
A letter which was sent by the Swiss Bankers Association to its members in December 1968 (following the Arzi Bank prosecution) is some
indication of how a distinction between foreign and U.S. borrowers in the
196Vanity Fair Mills v. T. Eaton Co., supra note 100.
197

Text at note 83, supra; United States v. Aluminum Company of America, supra note

80.

198

Cf 68 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 106, 108.
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application of the margin regulations would be received. The letter stated
that it was the position of the Association that Regulations G, T and U
were made in the interest of American credit policy and could not, from a
legal point of view, be applied to foreign financial institutions. Nevertheless, the Association recommended that Swiss banks keep informed as
to the margin rates in force and consider in a suitable way these margin
rates when granting credits to American customers against American securities. 199
Another factor which could be determinative in deciding whether a
foreign financial institution is transacting a securities business within the
jurisdiction of the United States is whether a power of attorney has been
given to a U.S. citizen or resident to place orders for the purchase and sale
of securities at a U.S. firm.200 If a foreign financial institution is engaging in
such a practice, a court could find that the institution is transacting business in the U.S. through an agent. In United States v. Scophony Corporation of America, 20 1 the question was raised as to whether a British
corporation, with its offices and principal place of business in London
"transacted business" or was "found" within the Southern District of New
York under the venue and service-of-process provisions set forth in Section 12 of the Clayton Act.2 0 2 The British corporation had transferred its
most crucial business interests to an American subsidiary, and the Court
found that the subsidiary was completely dominated and controlled by its
foreign parent. Further, the foreign corporation had given a comprehensive
power of attorney to one of its directors to act with regard to its interests in
the United States, including those of its American subsidiary. Based on
these facts, the Court found that the British corporation was transacting
business of a substantial character in New York, so as to establish venue
there, and that the corporation was found in New York, so as to be
203
amenable to service-of-process.
Nevertheless, in attempting to clarify the extent to which the antitrust
laws may regulate the activities of foreign companies, the Department of
Justice has stated that "[tihe mere maintenance or absence of agents or
t9 9

Swiss Bankers Ass'n Circular No. 3925 (Dec. 4, 1968). See Swiss Bankers Group
Acts to Dispel Idea of Illegal Activities, Wall St. J., Dec. 12, 1968, at 14, col. 3, Cf
EHRENZWEIG,
supra note 121, at 523-24.
2 00
1f a European bank is acting on behalf of a U. S. citizen or resident who is trading
actively, such an arrangement frequently would be necessary because of the time difference
between Europe and the United States.
201333 U. S. 795 (1948).
20215 U.S.C. § 22. The section of the Exchange Act setting forth venue and service-of-process requirements is very similar in its wording. 15 U.S.C. § 78aa.
203
Cf. United States v. Montreal Trust Co., supra note 105.
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subsidiaries in the United States neither grants nor negatives jurisdiction,
which depends rather upon a complete review of all activities of the foreign
company in the United States of a substantial character." Further, such
"substantial" activities which justify the assertion of jurisdiction, need not
20 4
be pursuant to the agreement illegal under the antitrust laws.
It should be noted that the credit restrictions placed upon a U.S. broker-dealer which maintains a cash or margin account for a foreign financial
institution are not affected by the question of whether such institutions are
subject to the margin regulations. If a foreign customer of a U.S. broker-dealer is violating the margin regulations, the U.S. broker-dealer is not
liable for such violations unless it aids or participates in them. 205 For
example, a U.S. broker-dealer could not direct its customers to a foreign
bank for the purpose of avoiding the margin regulations because this would
be arranging for credit on terms other than the U.S. broker-dealer could
give. There is no question of international law involved because the U.S.
broker-dealer would be prohibited from such activities whether the foreign
206
bank is subject to the margin regulations or an unregulated lender.
IV. The Positions of the Federal Regulatory Agencies
A. The FederalReserve Board
There are very few interpretations by the Federal Reserve Board dealing
with the applicability of the credit regulations to foreign financial institutions. The Board has ruled that when a creditor having a foreign
branch office which is carrying securities for a foreign customer executed
within the United States an order for the purchase of a registered security
for such foreign customer, such transaction is subject to the provisions of
Regulation T. 20 7 This interpretation implies that the nationality of the customer of a foreign bank is not relevant to the issue of whether the bank is
subject to the margin regulations.
In another ruling, the Board was asked whether a domestic broker may
borrow in the ordinary course of business from a foreign broker on regis2 04
Memorandum prepared by Dep't of Justice and transmitted to Embassy of Japan,
Washington, D. C., with note of July 3, 1958, M.S. Dep't of State, file 411.946/5-1458,

quoted
in 6 WHITEMAN, supra note 8 1, at 135-36.
2 05

Russell L. Irish, supra note 33.
Sutro Bros. & Co., supra note 13. See United States v. Lerner, supra note I; United
States v. Coggeshall & Hicks, supra note 4. In United States v. Weisscredit Banca Comerciale e D'Investimenti, supra note 1,the U.S. broker-dealer at which Weisscredit Bank
maintained an account was not named as a defendant or co-conspirator, but a vice-president
and registered representative of the firm was indicted.
2071934 Fed. Res. Bull. 692. The Board recently reaffirmed this interpretation in response to an inquiry by the New York Stock Exchange. M. F. Educational Circular No. 244
(Nov. 8, 1968).
2 06
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tered non-exempted securities. The foreign broker maintained no place of
business in the United States but transacted business in securities through
a member firm. The Board denied the domestic broker permission to effect
such loans and stated that it was therefore "unnecessary for present purposes to determine whether, or to what extent, the foreign broker would be
required to comply with Regulation T." However, the Board stated that
the foreign broker "appears to fall within the definition of the term 'creditor.'

"208

Between the date of this ruling (1939) and the present, the Federal
Reserve Board has either not decided or not stated whether foreign financial institutions are subject to Regulation T. In its initial announcements of
proposed amendments to the omnibus account provisions (set forth above),
the Board stated that the amendments were not intended to make foreign
banks or broker-dealers subject to Regulation T, but it did not state that
such institutions were not subject to the Regulation.20 9 By then amending
the omnibus account provisions so that only broker-dealers registered with
the SEC may now open or maintain omnibus accounts,2 10 the Board
avoided making any determination as to whether foreign financial institutions are subject to the margin regulations, and probably left the
resolution of this problem to the SEC, Department of Justice and private
litigants.
Similarly, although at the time the Federal Reserve Board initially promulgated Regulation G, it announced that foreign lenders would be subject
to the Regulation, this announcement was directly related to the proposed
agency provisions to Regulation T, U and G, and the agency provisions
never became effective. 2 1' However, when the Board revoked the agency
provisions, it did so on the ground that they were unenforceable, rather
than on the ground that the credit Regulations were inapplicable to foreign
212
institutions.
The abortive history of the agency provisions indicate that the Federal
Reserve Board would draw a distinction between situations in which foreign financial institutions are extending credit to U.S. citizens or residents
and situations where credit is extended to foreign nationals. Such a distinction would appear to have some basis under principles of international
law.2 13 Also, it is a distinction which has been made by the SEC with
2081939 Fed. Res. Bull. 721.
209
Text at note 47, supra.
21
°Text at notes 47-48, supra.
2 11
Text at notes 49-60, supra.
21 2
Text at note 53, supra.
213
Supra notes 197-99.
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respect to registration requirements the agency has imposed upon foreign
issuers. 214 Further, such a distinction would complement the Foreign In215
vestors Tax Act.
At the same time, a ruling that foreign financial institutions which extend
purpose credit to U.S. citizens or residents are subject to the margin
regulations, whereas institutions which only extend credit to foreign nationals are not, probably would encourage widespread evasion of the law.
Since a corporation has the nationality of the jurisdiction in which it is
incorporated,2 1 6 there would be nothing in the securities acts to prevent
Americans wishing to avoid the margin regulations by obtaining credit from
foreign banks from forming a foreign corporation to do So. 21 7 Further, a
U.S. citizen could become a customer of one foreign bank which could
than obtain a purpose loan from another foreign bank. Nevertheless, it may
be that because of the conflicting monetary public policy questions, and the
delicate international and foreign policy questions involved, this is an area
where the Federal Reserve Board would be willing to adopt a compromise
which would eliminate some, if not all, foreign credit flowing into the U.S.
securities markets. By amending the omnibus account provisions so as to
make the easier credit which may be obtained through an omnibus account
available only to broker-dealers registered with the SEC, the Board displayed restraint and flexibility in this area, and a disinclination to assert its
jurisdiction beyond its powers to enforce its regulations.
B. The SEC
Although the Federal Reserve Board promulgates and interprets the
credit regulations, the SEC is primarily responsible for enforcing them. In
general, and with regard to the credit regulations, the SEC takes a very
expansive view of its own jurisdiction.
In the amicus curiae brief which the SEC filed with the Second Circuit
in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 218 the argument was made that Section 30(b)
of the Exchange Act does not exempt any transactions in securities listed
21469 COLUM. L. REV., supra note 4, at 109-11.
215
Supra note 6.
2 6
1 Section 27, Restatement, supra note 83. This is an over-simplified statement of the
general rule in a complex and fluid area. See Kronstein, The Nationality of International
Enterprises, 52 COLUM. L. REV. 983 (1952); Vagt, The Corporate Alien: Definitional Questions in FederalRestraints on Foreign Enterprise,74 HARV. L. REV. 1489 (196 1).
2 17
Although the courts might pierce the corporate veil and find ultimate American
ownership and control in such a situation, they probably would not do so unless the corporation was a mere sham to evade the law. See McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, supra note
136. But see Bartholomew v. Universe Tankships, Inc., supra note 164. See also Timken
Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, supra note 157; United States v. Scophony Corporation
of America,
supra note 201; Kronstein, supra note 216; Vagt, supra note 216.
2 18
Supra note 4.
InternationalLawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3

Applicability of Margin Regulations

on a national exchange from the operations of the securities acts, if such
transactions affect a significant national interest, even if no jurisdictional
means are used in connection with these transactions. Further, the SEC
expressed the view that evasion or avoidance of the margin requirements
would be detrimental to a significant national interest.
Excessive speculation in listed securities, which [§§ 7 and 8 of the Exchange
Act] are designed to prevent, may have an adverse effect upon American
securities markets wherever it occurs. Indeed, in its report on the proposed
statute the Senate Committee expressly referred to the harmful effect caused
by heavy withdrawals of foreign funds from the call-money market in 1929.219
Similarly, in an interpretative release, 220 the SEC stated that it would
generally raise no objections if a foreign broker-dealer performed certain
limited functions in underwritings of American securities entirely or in part
abroad, without registering as a broker-dealer. This release was prompted
by the Fowler Report. 221 The limitations which the SEC placed on foreign
broker-dealers participating in underwritings were (1) taking down securities sold outside the jurisdiction of the United States to persons other
than American nationals; and (2) participating solely through membership
in the underwriting syndicate in activities of the syndicate in the United
States. The SEC pointed out that participation in such distributions would
not insulate a foreign broker-dealer from the broker-dealer registration
requirements if it engages in other activities which require registration.
Further, "such other activities would include either selling securities into
the United States or purchasing securities in the United States for sale to
American investors abroad." It therefore would appear that where a foreign broker-dealer maintains an account at an American broker-dealer
through which American securities are purchased and sold, the SEC would
claim that the foreign broker-dealer is effecting securities transactions
222
within the United States.
The impetus behind the recent indictments against foreign banks for
violations of the credit regulations has come, at least in part, from the
SEC. 223 However, these institutions were maintaining omnibus accounts,
219p. 19, note II. The legislative history of the Exchange Act does not support a
conclusion that Congress intended to regulate foreign financial institutions. Supra notes 23-24.
The SEC's position is criticized in 69 Colum. L. Rev., supra note 4, at 103, note 58.
22 0
Securities Exchange Act Release No. 7366 (July 9_1964). See also Securities Exchange
Act Release No. 8537 (Feb. 25, 1969).
22 1
Supra note 6.
22 2
Cf 11 Loss, supra note 14, at 1291-92, note 15.
22 3
The SEC transmits evidence of violations of the securities acts to the Attorney
General for criminal prosecution. Section 2 1(e) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78u(e). An
SEC employee swore out the information on which the indictment in the Arzi Bank case was
based.
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and in connection therewith signed written statements that they were either
subject to the provisions of Regulation T or would extend and maintain
credit to customers only as if subject thereto and in accordance therewith.
Therefore, these indictments do not necessarily stand for the proposition
that Regulation T applies to the credit relations between a foreign bank and
its customers if the bank is maintaining a cash or margin account.
As a practical matter, the extent to which foreign banks are or will
become subject to the credit regulations may depend on the extent to
which the SEC and the Justice Department decide to exert jurisdiction
over foreign banks. This type of informal administrative law does not lend
itself to theoretical analysis or easy prediction, but in areas such as this, it
is nevertheless often the only law there is. In a December 1968 Hearing
Before the House Committee on Banking and Currency regarding Practices of Foreign Banking Institutions, testimony was given by representatives of the SEC and the Justice Department regarding, among many other
things, evasion of the margin requirements by Americans through Swiss
bank accounts. These authorities indicated that they were primarily concerned with preventing Americans from concealing violations of federal
law through the use of Swiss bank accounts.22 4 Since a borrower who
obtains illegal credit is not guilty of any violation of the law, the interest of
the SEC in this area might be further limited to situations where U.S.
broker-dealers are assisting their customers to obtain financing through
foreign banks which the U.S. firms could not give.22 5
C. The Rule Making Power of the Regulatory Agencies

Section 30(b) of the Exchange Act specifically delegates to the SEC the
power to prescribe necessary or appropriate rules and regulations to prevent evasion of the Exchange Act.22 6 Although the House and Senate
reports on the Exchange Act do little more than paraphrase Section 30(b),
without elucidating its purpose, the language of the Senate report gives an
emphasis to this subsection which is worth noting:
Subsection (b) provides that nothing in the act or rules and regulations shall
apply to business in securities outside the jurisdiction of the United States
unless such rules and regulations expressly so provide in order to prevent
227
evasion.
224

Report of Proceedings, Practices of Foreign Banking Institutions, Hearing before
House
Committee
on Banking and Currency (Dec. 9, 1968).
22 5
Sutro Bros. & Co., supra note 13, at 445. This would appear to be one of the concerns
of the Federal Reserve Board in amending the omnibus account provisions. See text at note
47, supra. The principle that a borrower who obtains illegal credit is not guilty of any violation
of law has been clouded by two recent cases. See note 78, supra.
226
Text at note 92, supra.
227S. Rep. No. 792, supra note 15, at 23.
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The SEC has not prescribed any rules or regulations under Section 30(b).
The district court in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrookviewed such inaction in the
"obvious situation" of transactions in American securities effected abroad
as "further indication of the lack of interest by the United States in such
228
transactions."
The Federal Reserve Board similarly has authority to prescribe rules
and regulations to prevent evasion of the margin regulations by persons
who are not members of national securities exchanges, broker-dealers or
members of the Federal Reserve System.2 29 The first such regulation
passed by the Federal Reserve Board was Regulation G, which was primarily designed to capture the activities of factors and similar unregulated
U.S. lenders. The extent to which Regulation G was intended to capture
unregulated foreign lenders has never been made clear.23 0 Moreover, most
foreign financial institutions act as broker-dealers and banks, rather than as
ordinary Regulation G lenders. 23 1 Nevertheless, Regulation U could not
possibly be made applicable to foreign banks, 23 2 and Regulation T would
be a singularly inappropriate regulation to attempt to apply to foreign
banks.
This is because Regulation T covers all credit transactions between a
broker-dealer and its customers, 233 in a highly complex and technical
23 4
fashion. The New York Stock Exchange has its own margin regulations,
and the NASD has adopted Regulation T as'part of its Rules of Fair
Practice. 235 The day-to-day enforcement and interpretation of the credit
regulations is conducted primarily by these regulatory agencies, rather than
the SEC, and although the Federal Reserve Board interprets Regulation T
to the extent that it is queried about its meaning, the Board has no power to
236
institute any action to enforce Regulation T.
This diffused regulatory authority is viable only because U.S. broker-dealers, and particularly member firms of the New York Stock Exchange, have structured their back office operations in a manner designed
228268 F. Supp. at 393. Cf. Kook v. Crang, supra note 109, at 391.
22 9
Section 7(d) of the Exchange Act, 15 U.S.C. 78g(d). See S. Rep. No. 792, supra note
15, at 16; H. Rep. No. 1383, supra note 16, at 19.
2
3°Text at notes 54-64, supra.
23'Supra note 28. See Kelly & Webb, Credit and Securities: The Margin Requirements,
24 Bus. LAW. 1153 (1969).
2
23
Text at notes 26-27, supra.
3
2a WEISS, REGISTRATION AND REGULATION OF BROKERS AND DEALERS 74, notes 12 and
13 (1965).
234Rules 421, 431 and 432 of the New York Stock Exchange.
5
23 N.A.S.D. Manual
4001-25, 5267.
2a6 See Special Study, supra note 6, at 1-9. The SEC may review decisions of the NASD,
and overturn the agency's interpretations of Regulation T. See, e.g., Russell L. Irish, supra
note 33.
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to comply with Regulation T. Such firms have a "margin department,"
composed of "margin clerks" and their supervisors, whose primary function is to insure that adequate and proper margin is maintained in custom-

ers' accounts. This system is geared to the way in which U.S. securities
transactions are settled and cleared, particularly over the national securities exchanges. To direct foreign financial institutions to alter their daily
method of doing business in order to fit into this scheme would be pre23 7
posterous.

At the same time, there may be valid and justifiable reasons for subjecting foreign financial institutions to appropriate and workable rules and

regulations in their lending activities on U.S. securities, particularly to U.S.
citizens or residents. However, the crux of the problem is whether excessive foreign credit is flowing into the U.S. securities markets, through
evasions of the margin reulations, or rather, whether the amounts of foreign
credit is a mere leak which annoys the regulatory agencies. Both the
answer to this question and the solution to this problem, if indeed, a serious
problem exists, would appear to be peculiarly within the rule-making func238
tions of the SEC or the Federal Reserve Board.
The views expressed by the SEC in Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, indicate

that the agency does not regard its failure to enact rules or regulations
under Section 30(b) as fatal to the extraterritorial application of the margin
regulations. 239 The Federal Reserve Board has been extremely guarded in
stating whether Regulations T or G apply to foreign financial institutions. 2 40 If at this point the SEC should take action against a foreign
financial institution for violations of the margin regulations, it could well be
exceeding its jurisdiction and abusing its discretion in failing to proceed by
its rule-making powers.
237Most security credit is extended by member firms of the New York Stock Exchange.
In 1962, net debit balances at such member firms accounted for over 98% of such balances of
all broker-dealers registered with the SEC. Special Study, supra note 6, at 1. Regulation T
contemplates that the New York Stock Exchange will play an active role in its day-to-day
operation. For example, the Exchange has the power to grant extensions of time for the
payment of funds into customers' accounts. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.3(f) and 220.4(c)(6). In the case
of a non-member, the NASD may grant such extensions. Id. These extensions are an
important part of the mechanism by which Regulation T operates, and exemplify the impracticality of applying Regulation T to foreign banks. Cf. 12 C.F.R. 207.3(a). In the Special Study,
supra, at 5, the SEC stated that foreign banks were unregulated lenders, subject to neither
Regulations T nor U. Procedures to insure compliance with the margin requirements are
required to be adopted and followed by member firms as part of their day-to-day supervisory
responsibilities. See Dep't of Member Firms of the New York Stock Exchange, SUPERVISION
AND MANAGEMENT OF REGISTERED REPRESENTATIVES AND CUSTOMER ACCOUNTS, 3,8,

13,

17, 22 (1967).
869 COLUM. L. REV. supra note 4, at 108-1I.
239
Text at note 219, supra.
24 0
Text at notes 47, 51-53, 208-10, supra.
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The construction put on a statute by the agency charged with adminis-

tering it is entitled to deference by the courts, and ordinarily that construction will be affirmed if it has a reasonable basis in law. However, the courts
are the final authorities on issues of statutory construction, and may reverse an administrative decision which is inconsistent with a statutory
mandate, or the congressional policy underlying a statute. 24 1 Further, the
rules and regulations of an administrative agency may not extend a statute
or modify its provisions.2 42 Where an agency acts in excess of its delegated

powers, the courts may examine and overturn the agency's exercise of
jurisdiction.24 3 Where international affairs or foreign policy considerations
are jeopardized by the action of an administrative agency, the authority
delegated to the agency becomes particularly subject to judicial scrutiny
because the power to act on behalf of the United States in this area is
peculiar to the executive, rather than the legislative branch of the government.

244

Whether an administrative agency proceeds by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation is a choice that lies primarily within the agency's
discretion. However, since an agency has the ability to make new law
through the exercise of its rule-making power, it has less reason than a
court to rely upon ad hoc adjudication, for the purpose of formulating

standards of conduct for the future. In situations involving the retroactive
application of a new standard, the agency should generally proceed by

rule-making rather than adjudication except where (1) the agency cannot
reasonably foresee the problems involved when it institutes a case; (2) the
agency has insufficient experience with a problem to warrant the imposition
of a hard and fast rule; or (3) the problem is so specialized and varying in
2 45
nature as to be impossible of capture within a general rule.
24 1

Volkswagen Aktiengesselschaft v. Federal Maritime Commission, 390 U.S. 261, 272
(1968). 2
24 Campbell v. Galeno Chemical Company, 281 U.S. 586, 610 (1930); Morrill v. Jones,
106 U.S. 466 (1882).
2aMcCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional, supra note 136, at 16-17.
2441d.; see United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 318 (1936).
There is no real question that Regulations T and G were promulgated pursuant to legislative
power constitutionally delegated to the Federal Reserve Board. United States v. McDermott,
131 F.2d 313 (7th Cir. 1942), cert. denied, 318 U.S. 765 (1943); Collateral Lenders Committee v. Board of Governors, 281 F. Supp. 899 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). See generally SCHWARTZ,
AN INTRODUCTION TO AMERICAN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 26-54 (1958). However, powers
incidental to sovereignty in the international sense, are inherent in the executive, and were
never delegated to Congress by the states. This is why Congress cannot enact legislation
which is contrary to the law of nations. An administrative agency, being a creature of the
legislative branch, would similarly be prohibited from adopting or applying regulations contrary to the law of nations. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., supra. But see
Branch v. Federal Trade Commission, 141 F.2d 31 (7th Cir. 1944).
243Securities and Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947).
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Since the question of whether an agency should proceed by its
rule-making or adjudicative procedures in law making is essentially a question of jurisdiction, rather than of power,2 4 6 the courts have been reluctant
to hold that an agency abused its discretion in failing to take the

rule-making route.2 47 Nevertheless, the rule-making procedures of administrative agencies are probably the most important safeguard in the administrative process for insuring the fair and proper exercise of their powers.24 8
In an area which impinges upon international relations such as the extraterritorial application of the margin regulations, the SEC and the Federal
Reserve Board would be well advised to proceed by their rule-making

powers, rather than the less politic procedure of criminal prosecution, or
24 9
even civil injunctive action.

V. Liabilities for Violation of the Credit Regulations
A. Action by the SEC
When violations of the credit regulations are discovered by the SEC, the

agency may institute an injunctive action pursuant to Section 2 1(c) of the
Exchange Act,25 0 or administrative proceedings pursuant to Section
15(b)(5) of the Exchange Act. 251 Although the SEC would have power to

institute administrative proceedings against a foreign financial institution, it
is extremely unlikely that it would do so, because the only sanction which
the agency could impose would be to bar the institution from being registered as a broker-dealer. This is an irrelevant remedy against a foreign
financial institution which is not so registered. However, if a U.S. bro24 6

National Labor Relations Board v. A.P.W. Prods. Co., 316 F.2d 899 (2d Cir. 1963).
But see National Labor Relations Board v. Guy F. Atkinson Co., 195 F.2d 141 (9th
Cir. 1952).
24 8
SCHWARTZ, supra note 244, at 55-75.
24 9
At the very least, an interpretative release would be in order. Cf. Text at notes
220-22, supra. In United States v. Lerner, supra note I, and United States v. Banca
Weisscredit Comerciale e D'Investimenti, supra note 1, indictments for violations of the
omnibus account provisions were returned after such provisions had been amended so as to
eliminate the possibility of any future violations such as alleged in the indictments. The
propriety of such actions, especially as against the foreign defendants, is very questionable.
25015 U.S.C. § 78u(c). There are no reported cases involving injunctive actions instituted
by the SEC based on violations of the credit regulations. In 1947, the agency brought four
injunctive actions against broker-dealers for violations of the credit regulations. Three of the
cases were disposed of without the entry of a final order of permanent injunction. In the other
case, one defendant consented to the entry of an injunction and the other defendant defaulted.
These were the first injunctive actions brought by the SEC based on Regulation T violations,
and they appear to have been test cases. 13 SEC Ann. Rep. 59 (1947). See Comment, 62Nw.
U. L. REV. 587 (1967).
25115 U.S.C. § 78o(b)(5). The SEC has instituted a number of cases against broker-dealers for violations of Regulation T. However, it has also relied on the stock exchanges
and the NASD to enforce the credit regulations against their members. See note 237, supra.
24 7

International Lawyer, Vol. 4, No. 3

Applicability of Margin Regulations

ker-dealer should violate the credit regulations in its dealings with a foreign
financial institution, administrative proceedings would be appropriate
252
against the U.S. broker-dealer.
In an injunctive action, the SEC could obtain a court order prohibiting a
foreign financial institution from extending or maintaining credit in violation of the margin regulations. If the bank then refuses to comply with this
order, the bank could be held in contempt of court and fined. Because of
liberal venue and service provisions of federal law, the SEC could probably
obtain personal jurisdiction over a foreign bank which has no place of
253
business in the U.S.
Since the SEC has no power to fine, and no money damages can be
obtained in an injunctive action, the financial risks of failing to comply with
the margin requirements are not great, insofar as possible government
action is concerned. However, the adverse publicity from such an action
and the damage to a foreign bank's reputation in the American investment
community could seriously impair the bank's ability to do business with
U.S. broker-dealers or banks.
B. Civil Liability in a PrivateLawsuit

The prohibitions of Regulation T run against the lender, rather than the
borrower. In an extremely aggravated case, it is possible that a court would
hold that the borrower aided and abetted the lender's violations. However,
since the regulations were intended, in part, to protect the borrower against
his own speculative follies, he may sue the lender for violating the credit
regulations, and collect any damages he can prove resulted from such
violations. The borrower's participation in the violation does not neces25 4
sarily preclude him from such recovery.
Further, Section 29(b) of the Exchange Act 25 5 makes void any contract
in violation of the Act or the rules thereunder. Accordingly, a foreign bank
which extends credit to a customer in violation of Regulation T may be
precluded from suing the customer for breach of a loan or sales contract.
Therefore, an unscrupulous speculator has considerable (although not complete) license in this area if the securities he buys on illegal credit decline in
price. In Serzyskso v. The Chase ManhattanBank,256 a professional trader
2
2-1
E.g., Sutro Bros. & Co., supra note 13.

2 3 United States v. Scophony Corporation of America, supra note 201; Securities and
Exchange Commission v. VTR, Incorporated, supra note 101.
254 Remar v. Clayton Securities Corp., supra note 18. But see Moscarelli v. Stamm, supra
note 18. Kelly & Webb supra note 231, at 1170-74. See note 78, supra.
2515 U.S.C. § 78cc(b).
6
25 Supra note 18.
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borrowed money from a bank to speculate in violation of Regulation U and
intentionally misled the bank as to the purposes of the loan made. He sued
the bank for selling out the collateral pledged for the loan at a loss. The
court denied recovery on the ground that he was a professional, engaged in
the securities business, and he had intentionally attempted to evade the
margin regulations. However, the court also denied the bank recovery on
the amount of the loan still due because the bank had violated Regulation
U.
C. CriminalProsecution
Section 32(a) of the Exchange Act 257 provides for criminal penalties, of
both imprisonment and fine, for willful violations of the provisions of the
Act. Although this section states that "no person shall be subject to
imprisonment under this section for the violation of any rule or regulation if
he proves that he had no knowledge of such rule or regulation" this
provision does not affect the power of the government to impose fines for
such violations. 25 8 Furthermore, in the Arzi Bank case the federal authorities seized securities which the bank had at member firms as "fruits of the
crime," apparently to insure that any fine levied against the defendant
would be paid. The bank was fined $2,500, although a $10,000 fine for
each violation could have been imposed under Section 32(a).
Since the question of whether a foreign financial institution is subject to
Regulation T or G is so unsettled at this time, it would appear difficult for
the Government to prove that a foreign bank official had knowledge of
25 9
these regulations to the extent necessary to justify a criminal judgment.
VI. Conclusion
The Federal Reserve Board and the SEC have shown an inclination to
apply the credit regulations, specifically Regulations T and G, to foreign
financial institutions in their credit relations with their customers involving
loans to purchase or carry U.S. securities, collateralized by such securities.
The Federal Reserve Board has indicated that it might distinguish between
U.S.C. § 78ff(a).
United States v. Guterma, 189 F. Supp. 265, 275 (S.D.N.Y. 1960). Proof of "no
knowledge" of a rule requires at least proof of an ignorance of the substance of the rule, proof
that the defendant did not know his conduct was contrary to law. United States v. Lilley,
Docket No. Cir. 67-H-233 (S.D.Tex. Oct. 2, 1968) (mer.).
259
See text at notes 100-07, supra. Nevertheless, the principals of foreign financial
institutions have been indicted for violations of the margin regulations. Supra note 107. The
only reported judicial opinion involving a criminal prosecution for violations of Regulation T
is United States v. McDermott, supra note 244.
5715
8

2
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loans to U.S. citizens or residents and loans to foreign nationals in applying
the credit regulations to foreign financial institutions. However, the Federal
Reserve Board has not yet rendered a definite interpretation in this area,
and the SEC has not taken any definitive action or announced any definitive policy.
The application of the credit regulations to foreign financial institutions
would pose very serious questions under international law. To the extent
that federal law has been applied extraterritorially in the past, there are no
instances where a scheme of federal regulation has been applied to the
day-to-day operations of a foreign industry such as banking which is
traditionally subject to local regulation. Additionally, Section 30(b) of the
Exchange Act provides an exemption from all provisions of the Act for any
person insofar as he transacts a business in securities without the jurisdiction of the United States. Accordingly, an attempt by the regulatory
agencies to apply the margin regulations to foreign financial institutions
might not be upheld by the courts.
No similar problems of international law are presented by the prohibitions upon a U. S. broker-dealer against arranging for credit extensions by
a foreign financial institution. Further, the conduct of accounts of foreign
financial institutions are generally governed by the rules applicable to the
accounts of other customers, insofar as a U. S. broker-dealer is concerned.
The application of Regulation T to foreign financial institutions would
pose serious practical, as well as legal, problems. Although Regulation G
could be more readily applied as a practical matter, the logic of subjecting
them to this Regulation is questionable, because many if not most of the
institutions which use jurisdictional facilities in connection with their credit
transactions on U.S. securities do so as broker-dealers.
The SEC and Federal Reserve Board probably have the power to
subject foreign financial institutions to some type of credit restrictions in
their dealings in U. S. securities, at least with regard to U. S. citizens or
nationals, if such dealings constitute a serious evasion of the credit regulations. In view of the delicate questions of foreign and economic policy,
and the complex legal and practical problems involved in this area, it is
submitted that any efforts to subject foreign financial institutions to the
credit regulations should be accomplished through the rule-making powers
of these agencies.
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